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COMMENTS
WAIVER OF BECK RIGHTS AND




"[T]he struggle of man against power has been the struggle of memory
against forgetting."1
Traditionally, the obligation to pay dues' has been considered to arise
from only two sources: union membership3 and union security agree-
ments.4 Union membership requires the employee to contribute dues in
* First Place, John H. Fanning Labor Law Writing Competition, Columbus School of
Law, the Catholic University of America, 1992.
1. MILAN KUNDERA, THE BOOK OF LAUGHTER AND FORGETrING 3 (Michael H.
Heim trans., Penguin Books 1986) (1978).
2. Unions garner the bulk of their revenue from the payment of dues and assess-
ments by the employees they represent. See Jennifer Friesen, The Costs of "Free
Speech"-Restrictions on the Use of Union Dues to Fund New Organizing, 15 HAsTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 603, 603-04 (1988) (articulating the importance of dues to the continued vital-
ity of the labor movement, particularly in the context of organizing nonunionized workers).
Unions generally expend dues on core workplace activities such as contract negotiation,
adjustment of employee grievances, staff salaries, and free publications concerning items of
importance to represented employees. See id, at 603.
3. Most unions calibrate monthly membership dues at approximately double the
hourly wage rate. The local union collects and allocates dues between the local and na-
tional (or international) union treasuries according to the provisions of the national (or
international) constitution. Usually the dues are evenly divided between the local and na-
tional (or international) union. Jan W. Henkel & Norman J. Wood, Limitations on the
Uses of Union Shop Funds After Ellis: What Activities Are "Germane" to Collective Bar-
gaining?, 35 LAB. LJ. 736, 743-44 (1984) (citing Charles W. Hickman, Labor Organiza-
tions' Fees and Dues, MONTHLY LAB. REV., May 1977, at 19, 21-22).
4. Id. A "union security agreement" is an agreement between the employer and the
union that directs the employer to require all employees to engage in some specified de-
gree of union support as a condition of employment. ROBERT GORMAN, BASIC TEXT ON
LABOR LAW: UNIONIZATION AND COLLECIVE BARGAINING 639 (1976). Union security
agreements are authorized by Sections 8(a)(3) and 8(b)(2) of the National Labor Relations
Act of 1935, as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(3), 8(b)(2) (1988) [hereinafter Taft-Hartley
Act, cited by section number]. 2 THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAw 1495 (Charles J. Morris et
al. eds., 3d ed. 1992). Section 8(a)(3) of the Act declares that an employer commits an
unfair labor practice:
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accordance with the provisions of the union constitution5 or forfeit good
[B]y discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or
condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor
organization: Provided, That nothing in this subchapter, or in any other statute of
the United States, shall preclude an employer from making an agreement with a
labor organization (not established, maintained, or assisted by any action defined
in this subsection as an unfair labor practice) to require as a condition of employ-
ment membership therein on or after the thirtieth day following the beginning of
such employment or the effective date of such agreement, whichever is the later,
(i) if such labor organization is the representative of the employees as provided in
section 159(a) of this title, in the appropriate collective-bargaining unit covered
by such agreement when made, and (ii) unless following an election held as pro-
vided in section 159(e) of this title within one year preceding the effective date of
such agreement, the Board shall have certified that at least a majority of the em-
ployees eligible to vote in such election have voted to rescind the authority of
such labor organization to make such an agreement: Provided further, That no
employer shall justify any discrimination against an employee for nonmembership
in a labor organization (A) if he has reasonable grounds for believing that such
membership was not available to the employee on the same terms and conditions
generally applicable to other members, or (B) if he has reasonable grounds for
believing that membership was denied or terminated for reasons other than the
failure of the employee to tender the periodic dues and the initiation fees uni-
formly required as a condition of acquiring or retaining membership....
29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3). Section 8(b)(2) determines that it is an unfair labor practice for a
labor organization (union):
[Tio cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against an employee
in violation of subsection (a)(3) of this section or to discriminate against an em-
ployee with respect to whom membership in such organization has been denied or
terminated on some ground other than his failure to tender the periodic dues and
the initiation fees uniformly required as a condition of acquiring or retaining
membership....
Id. § 158(b)(2). In its 1947 amendments to the NLRA, Congress included Section 14(b),
which entitles states to prohibit union security agreements. Id. § 164(b) ("Nothing in this
subchapter shall be construed as authorizing the execution or application of agreements
requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment in any State or
Territory in which such execution or application is prohibited by State or Territorial law.").
Section 14(b) is an express congressional exemption from the federal preemption generally
accorded to the Taft-Hartley Act. See 2 THm DEVELOPNG LABOR LAW, supra, at 1528.
As of 1990, 21 states have outlawed various forms of union security agreements by statute
or constitution. Id. at 1528-29 & n.227 (Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia,
Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Nebraska, Nevada, North Carolina, North Da-
kota, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Wyoming). Popu-
larly known as "right-to-work laws" (or dubbed "right-to-work-for-less" laws by union
adherents), these measures entitle employees to work without the incumbent obligation of
joining any union, including a union chosen as the employees' bargaining representative.
Id. at 1529 & n.228.
5. See, e.g., International Union of Electronic, Electrical, Salaried, Machine and Fur-
niture Workers, AFL-CIO, International Constitution art. XIII (1991) (discussing reve-
nue); International United Mine Workers of America, UMWA Constitution art. 13 (1983)
(discussing initiation fees, dues and assessments).
[Vol. 43:159
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standing.6 Union security agreements between the employer and the
union compel employees to obtain and maintain membership in a union
as a condition of employment.7 When membership is imposed as a condi-
tion of employment, payment of fees and dues is the only aspect of mem-
bership that may be exacted from the employee.'
6. The term "member in good standing" is defined by Section 402(o) of the Labor-
Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (LMRDA):
"Member" or "member in good standing," when used in reference to a labor
organization, includes any person who has fulfilled the requirements for member-
ship in such organization, and who neither has voluntarily withdrawn from mem-
bership nor has been expelled or suspended from membership after appropriate
proceedings consistent with lawful provisions of the constitution and bylaws of
such organization.
29 U.S.C. § 402(o) (1988). For provisions relating to levy of dues, initiation fees and assess-
ments by labor organizations, see id. § 411(a)(3).
7. 2 THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 4, at 1365. There are several forms
of union security devices. "Union shop" clauses mandate that all present and new employ-
ees join the union within an explicit period of time and remain in good standing through
the duration of the contract or suffer discharge by the employer. "Agency shop" provi-
sions do not make employment expressly conditional upon membership. However, em-
ployees must contribute payments equal to the initiation fee and periodic dues paid by
union members. FLORIAN BARTosIC & ROGER C. HART=nY, LABOR RELATIONS LAW IN
THE PRIVATE SECrOR 420 (2d ed. 1986). "Maintenance of membership" agreements are a
weaker form of union security in that nonmembers are never compelled to join the union.
Pursuant to such provisions, all employees who are union members when the contract is
executed or at a specified later time, and all employees who subsequently become mem-
bers, are required to retain membership as a condition of employment. However, the sole
requirement of membership is payment of dues. 2 THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra
note 4, at 1390. The overwhelming majority of collective bargaining agreements in the
private sector contain some form of union security provision. See BUREAU OF LABOR
STATISTICS, U.S. DsP'T OF LABOR, BULL. No. 1425-21, MAJOR COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
AoREEMEMIS: UNION SEcuRIrY AND DUEs CrmCKOFF PROVISIONS 1, 5 (1982) (reporting
in the Department's most recent study that 83 percent of 1327 major private industry col-
lective bargaining agreements include union security provisions, affecting 5.5 million work-
ers); see also Dennis C. Shea, Unions, Union Membership, and Union Security, 11 SzTON
HALL LEGIs. J., 1, 6-15 & n.19 (1987) (assessing the types and frequency of union security
provisions in collective bargaining agreements).
8. NLRB v. General Motors Corp., 373 U.S. 734, 742 (1963). In General Motors the
Court did not expressly declare that unions may not require full membership. Rather, the
Court construed Section 8(a)(3) as permitting weaker forms of union security than the
union shop:
Under the second proviso to § 8(a)(3), the burdens of membership upon which
employment may be conditioned are expressly limited to the payment of initia-
tion fees and monthly dues. It is permissible to condition employment upon
membership, but membership, insofar as it has significance to employment rights,
may in turn be conditioned only upon payment of fees and dues. "Membership" as
a condition of employment is whittled down to its financial core.
Id. (emphasis added). Since the legality of union compulsion of active membership has
never been squarely presented, the Supreme Court's reticence on the subject is under-
standable. BARToSiC & HARTLEY, supra note 7, at 424. Nevertheless, the Board has con-
sistently leaned towards permitting only exaction of minimal periodic dues and initiation
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The National Labor Relations Board's (NLRB or Board) decision in
Lockheed Space Operations Co.' and subsequent Board opinions 0 indi-
cate that, under certain circumstances, dues checkoff" can function as a
third, independent source of dues obligation. 2 Pursuant to a dues check-
fees. See In re Union Starch & Ref. Co., 87 N.L.R.B. 779 (1949) (holding that employment
may not be conditioned on taking a union oath, attending meetings, or fulfilling any other
obligation imposed by a union's constitution), enforced, 186 F.2d 1008 (7th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 342 U.S. 815 (1951); see also United Stanford Employees, Local 680, 232 N.L.R.B.
326 (1977) (finding that where a contract contained a maintenance of membership clause,
it was an unfair labor practice for the union to notify employees that they were required to
sign membership cards and take a union oath), enforced, 601 F.2d 980 (9th Cir. 1979).
9. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local No. 2088 (Lockheed Space Operations
Co.), 302 N.L.R.B. 322 (1991) [hereinafter Lockheed].
10. See, e.g., American Tel. & Tel. Co., 303 N.L.R.B. 944 (1991); Washington Gas
Light Co., 302 N.L.R.B. 425 (1991); United Steelworkers, Local 4671 (National Oil Well,
Inc.), 302 N.L.R.B. 367 (1991) [hereinafter National Oil Well]; United Postal Serv., 302
N.L.R.B. 332 (1991).
11. Dues checkoff authorization is a convenient method for employees to fulfill the
financial obligations imposed on them pursuant to a union security agreement. Checkoff
further relieves unions of the expensive and burdensome administrative task of individu-
ally collecting membership dues. BARTOSIC & HARTLEY, supra note 7, at 449. Most major
collective bargaining agreements contain checkoff provisions. See Dep't of Labor, Bull.
No. 1425-21, supra note 7, at 23 (reporting that 86 percent of 1327 major collective bargain-
ing agreements include checkoff clauses, covering 5.2 million workers).
The Taft-Hartley Act criminalizes unauthorized employer contributions to unions while
legalizing dues checkoff agreements. 29 U.S.C. § 186 (1988). Section 302(a) of the Taft-
Hartley Act broadly prohibits payments by an employer to his employees' bargaining rep-
resentative, subject to exceptions enumerated in Section 302(c). Id. § 186(a). Section
302(c)(4) of the Thft-Hartley Act excludes dues checkoff authorization agreements from
the general Section 302(a) prohibition against employer donations to unions:
The provisions of this section shall not be applicable... with respect to money
deducted from the wages of employees in payment of membership dues in a labor
organization: Provided, That the employer has received from each employee, on
whose account such deductions are made, a written assignment which shall not be
irrevocable for a period of more than one year, or beyond the termination date of
the applicable collective agreement, whichever occurs sooner....
Id. § 186(c)(4).
12. The Board in Lockheed stated:
Explicit language within the checkoff authorization clearly setting forth an obliga-
tion to pay dues even in the absence of union membership will be required to
establish that the employee has bound himself or herself to pay the dues even
after resignation of membership. If an authorization contains such language, dues
may properly continue to be deducted from the employee's earnings and turned
over to the union during the entire agreed-upon period of irrevocability, even if
the employee states he or she has had a change of heart and wants to revoke the
authorization.
Lockheed, 302 N.L.R.B. at 329; see also National Oil Well, 302 N.L.R.B. at 368 & n.9
(finding that where the employee was not employed under a union security agreement, the
post-resignation dues obligation arose from the checkoff authorization); Roger C. Hartley,
Recent Developments Under the National Labor Relations Act, Address Before the Com-
mittee on the Development of the Law Under the National Labor Relations Act (March 1-
5, 1992) (analyzing NLRB opinions concerning checkoff and alerting the labor law commu-
[Vol. 43:159
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off authorization clause of a collective bargaining agreement, the em-
ployer directly deducts, or checks off, membership dues from employees'
wages and remits them to the union.13 Even when incorporated in a col-
lective bargaining agreement, checkoff is not mandatory. Section
302(c)(4) of the Taft-Hartley Act requires that each employee execute a
dues checkoff authorization form consenting to checkoff.14 Furthermore,
the duration of checkoff is not limitless."5 Employees must be afforded
the opportunity to revoke their dues checkoff authorization at the end of
one year, or upon expiration of the collective bargaining agreement,
whichever occurs first.1 6
Prior to Lockheed, scholars considered dues checkoff a relatively mi-
nor form of union security.17 Checkoff was touted primarily as a conve-
nient method for expediting employee discharge of financial obligations
under a union security agreement." In Lockheed, the Board determined
that checkoff may survive membership resignation where the employee's
nity to the significance of this line of cases for waiver of other statutory rights) (transcript
on file with the Catholic University Law Review).
13. BARTosic & HARTLEY, supra note 7, at 449.
14. 29 U.S.C. § 186(a). Section 302(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act
(LMRA or Taft-Hartley) broadly prohibits any payment of funds from an employer to the
collective bargaining representative of his employees. Section 302(c), however, provides
several exceptions. See supra note 11; see also Armco, Inc. v. NLRB, 832 F.2d 357 (6th Cir.
1987) (holding that coercion to sign checkoff under threat of discharge is illegal), cert.
denied, 486 U.S. 1042 (1988); 2 Tim DEVELOPING LABoR LAw, supra note 4, at 1554
("Checkoff is valid only insofar as it is authorized; and a checkoff without authorization, or
beyond its terms, may constitute an unfair labor practice.").
15. 29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(4); BARTosic & HARTLEY, supra note 7, at 452.
16. 29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(4). Section 302(c)(4) explicitly states that checkoff authoriza-
tion "shall not be irrevocable for a period of more than one year." La However, shortly
after passage of the Taft-Hartley Act, the Justice Department announced that automatic-
renewal clauses would not invite prosecution provided the employee is afforded an annual
"escape period." Dep't of Justice Opinion on Checkoff, 22 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 46 (1948).
Courts have generally concurred with the Justice Department and validated authorizations
with automatic renewal clauses and window escape periods. See e.g., Monroe Lodge No.
770 v. Litton Business Sys., Inc., 334 F. Supp. 310,315 (W.D. Va. 1971), affd, 80 L.R.R.M.
(BNA) 2379 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 879 (1972); Brooks v. Continental Can Corp.,
59 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2779 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). Attempted revocation outside the stipulated
escape period, where not concurrent with resignation of union membership, will be
deemed ineffective. See United Elec. Radio & Mach. Workers Local 123 v. Westinghouse
Elec. Corp., 345 F. Supp. 274 (W.D. Pa. 1972), affd, 478 F.2d 1399 (3d Cir. 1973).
17. GORMAN, supra note 4, at 639.
18. See, e.g., BARTosic & HARTLEY, supra note 7, at 449 (stating that checkoff "pro-
vides employees a convenient method of discharging financial obligations under a union
security agreement and saves unions the costly administrative expense of collecting mem-
bership dues"). But see 2 THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 4, at 1547 (stating
that the primary value of dues checkoff to the union is administrative convenience, "[b]ut
in right-to-work states the checkoff assumes greater significance, for it may be the only
lawful union-security device available").
1993]
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waiver of his right to revoke dues checkoff authorization is "clear and
unmistakable."' 9 Post-resignation survivability indicates that checkoff
can function as more than a mere method of dues payment;20 dues check-
off may compel dues payment.2 The Board's decision notably elevates a
previously underutilized source of dues obligation more than a half-cen-
tury after the passage of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).2
19. Lockheed, 302 N.L.R.B 322, 328 (1991) ("We will require clear and unmistakable
language waiving the right to refrain from assisting a union, just as we require such evi-
dence of waiver with regard to other statutory rights."). The Board analyzed the wording
of the dues checkoff authorization at issue in Lockheed and considered the language insuf-
ficiently clear to warrant the conclusion that the employee had waived his right to revoke
checkoff authorization. Id. at 330. Consequently, the checkoff authorization did not sur-
vive after the employee resigned. Id. However, in National Oil Well, 302 N.L.R.B. 367
(1991), the dues checkoff authorization did survive the employee's resignation because
"the language [of the authorization] clearly indicated an agreement to pay dues 'irrespec-
tive of my membership in the Union."' Lockheed, 302 N.L.R.B. at 329 n.28 (citing Na-
tional Oil Well, 302 N.L.R.B. at 367); see also National Oil Well, 302 N.L.R.B. at 368
("Because there is explicit language within the checkoff authorization clearly setting forth
an obligation to pay dues even in the absence of union membership, dues were still owing
under [the employee's] checkoff authorization after his resignation of membership.").
20. Lockheed, 302 N.L.R.B. at 329. The Lockheed Board emphasized the relationship
between clarity of language and waiver of the right to revoke dues checkoff authorization.
See supra note 12.
21. National Oil Well, 302 N.L.R.B. at 368 ("Applying the analysis of Lockheed to the
facts in this case, we find that the Respondent [union] has shown that the dues-checkoff
authorization signed by the Charging Party [resignee] obligated him to pay dues after his
effective resignation from membership in Local 4671."); see also 2 THE DEVELOPING LA-
BOR LAW, supra note 4, at 1555 ("An employee's resignation from the union does not
necessarily terminate the effectiveness of a dues checkoff authorization or relieve the em-
ployer of its obligation to withhold union dues pursuant to the checkoff authorization.").
22. A few earlier Board opinions presaged the Board's directive in Lockheed that
checkoff agreements can comprise a discreet source of dues obligation. See, e.g., Frito-Lay,
Inc., 243 N.L.R.B. 137, 139 (1979) (holding that resignation and attempted revocation of
checkoff authorization outside of designated window periods cannot curtail continuation of
dues checkoff); Shen-Mar Food Prods., Inc., 221 N.L.R.B. 1329, 1329-30 (1976), enforced as
modified, 557 F.2d 396 (4th Cir. 1977). Compare San Diego County District Council of
Carpenters (Campbell Indus.), 243 N.L.R.B. 147, 149 (1979).
In Shen-Mar, the employer refused to continue dues checkoff of nine employees who
resigned their union memberships and endeavored to revoke their checkoff authorizations
during the time frame when their authorizations were still irrevocable. Shen-Mar, 221
N.L.R.B. at 1329. The employer defended its action on the ground that checkoff of
resignee dues would be tantamount to approving a union security device for compelling
union membership. Id. Since Virginia is a right-to-work state outlawing union security
agreements, the employer reasoned that continuation of checkoff would conflict with Sec-
tion 14(b) of the Taft-Hartley Act, which permits states to enforce prohibition of union
security agreements. Id. The Board, concurring with the administrative law judge below,
held that dues checkoff authorizations were exclusively within the province of federal law
and thus preempted from any state regulation under Section 14(b) of the Taft-Hartley Act.
Id. Moreover, the Board reasoned that "the dues checkoff herein does not, in and of itself,
impose union membership or support as a condition required for continued employment."
Id. at 1330. Consequently, the employer was held to have committed the unfair labor
[Vol. 43:159
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More significantly, the Board's reasoning in Lockheed raises startling
questions concerning the waivability of both "Beck rights"'z and the right
to resign.24
Beck rights, first recognized in Communication Workers v. Beck,' des-
ignate the right of employees not to support certain activities financed by
compulsory dues and fees.26 Pursuant to Section 9(a) of the Taft-Hartley
Act, 27 once elected by the majority, the union must represent all employ-
ees in the bargaining unit,28 including nonmembers or financial core em-
practices of unlawful interference under Section 8(a)(1) of the Taft-Hartley Act and for
abrogating its bargaining duty under Section 8(a)(5). I& at 1329.
23. "Beck rights" is the shorthand denomination for the rights of nonunion members
employed pursuant to union security agreements to object to certain uses of mandatory
periodic payments of dues and initiation fees. See generally Friesen, supra note 2 (discuss-
ing the impact of Beck and related cases on the status of dues use in organizing cam-
paigns). Waiver of Beck rights would enable unions to streamline financial planning and
improve performance of their dual economic and democratic roles. See discussion infra
notes 182-251 and accompanying text.
24. The Lockheed Board expressly declined to opine on the waivability of resignation
rights. Lockheed, 302 N.L.R.B. at 328 n.25. The Board stated:
Because the authorization is not sufficiently clear to waive either the Sec. 7 right
to resign union membership or the right to refrain from assisting a union, we need
not, and do not, decide whether or not an employee may, by authorization or
other form of contract that he signs as an individual, agree to an enforceable
waiver of the right to resign for a limited period.
Id.
Nevertheless, it bears noting that "strikes do not seem to cost society a substantial
amount of goods and services. For the economy as a whole, the percentage of total work-
ing time lost directly to strikes" from around 1960 to 1980 averaged less than 0.2 percent
per year. Richard B. Freeman & James L. Medoff, The T1vo Faces of Unionism, Pus.
INTErREST, Fall 1979, at 69, 81-82; see infra notes 252-367 and accompanying text.
25. 487 U.S. 735 (1988).
26. Id. at 762-63. The Court stated: "We conclude that § 8(a)(3), like its statutory
equivalent, § 2, Eleventh of the RLA, authorizes the exaction of only those fees and dues
necessary to 'performing the duties of an exclusive representative of the employees in deal-
ing with the employer on labor-management issues."' Id. (quoting Ellis v. Brotherhood of
Ry., Airline & S.S. Clerks, 466 U.S. 435, 448 (1984)). For a definition of Beck rights, see
supra note 23. For further discussion of the Beck decision and waivability of Beck rights,
see infra notes 182-251 and accompanying text.
27. Section 9(a) of the Taft-Hartley Act provides:
Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective bargain-
ing by the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes, shall
be the exclusive representatives of all the employees in such unit for the purposes
of collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or
other conditions of employment ....
29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1988).
28. "Bargaining unit" denotes the group of employees, determined by the NLRB,
which the local union represents for collective bargaining and grievance adjustment. See
THEoPHmL C. KAMMHor.z & STANLEY R. STRAUSS, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE BEFoRE
THE NATIONAL LAnOR RELAInoNs BoARD 24 (4th ed. 1987); ORGANIZING AND mE LAW
216-18 (Stephen I. Schlossberg & Judith A. Scott eds., 4th ed. 1991). In an election to
166 Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 43:159
ployees. 9 Union adherents advocate that all represented employees
should contribute to the expenses of collective bargaining.3" Moreover,
unions urge, collective bargaining activities extend well beyond the con-
ventional bargaining table to encompass organizing, lobbying, and partic-
ipation in social, charitable, and political events vital to bolstering the
union's bargaining clout." Financial core employees forcefully counter
determine whether a particular union will represent them, all employees in the bargaining
unit are eligible to cast votes. If the union wins a majority of votes, it is empowered and
obligated to represent all employees in the bargaining unit, regardless whether the employ-
ees are union sympathizers or members. See 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1988); Steele v. Louisville
& Nash. R.R., 323 U.S. 192,204 (1944) (holding that a union, as exclusive bargaining rep-
resentative, must fairly represent all employees in negotiation and enforcement of the con-
tract); see also Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330 (1953) (applying Steele's
construction of the Railway Labor Act to Section 9(a) of the Taft-Hartley Act).
29. This Comment utilizes the terms "financial core employee" and "dues objector"
synonymously. The Board defines the term "financial core employee" in its proposed
rulemaking for enforcing the Beck decision as "an employee who is not a full member of
the Union, but who is required to pay the equivalent of fees and dues to retain his employ-
ment under a contractual union security provision." 57 Fed. Reg. 43,642 (1992) (to be
codified at 29 C.F.R § 103) (proposed Sept. 22, 1992). By contrast, "full member" denotes
"an employee who has fulfilled the requirements for membership in a labor organization[,]
has voluntarily joined the labor organization, and who neither has voluntarily resigned
from membership nor has been expelled or suspended from membership." Id.
30. See Roger C. Hartley, Constitutional Values and the Adjudication of Taft-Hartley
Act Dues Objector Cases, 41 HASTWnS LcJ. 1, 2 n.7 (1989) ("[U]nions argue that the statu-
tory duty to represent the entire bargaining unit obligates each employee who receives the
benefit of unionization to pay a fair share of its cost. Only then can the aspiration of
industrial stability, secured by a vibrant collective bargaining system, be achieved."). Pro-
fessor Hartley has pointed out the larger philosophical issues looming behind the union's
facile anti-free rider argument:
[Tlhat "majority rule" includes the ability to restrict the minority; that use of
compulsory dues for political or ideological purposes is not oppressive to the indi-
vidual, union-represented dues objector, that a strong trade union movement re-
quires autonomy from the state and, concomitantly, limited governmental
interference with internal union affairs; and that dues objectors' challenges, while
clothed in the language of free expressive association and respect for individual
autonomy, are financed by corporate funds expended to isolate unions politically
and weaken unions' ability to speak for their members and working people
generally.
Id. at 4-5 (footnotes omitted).
31. Professor Jennifer Friesen notes that "[u]nions are ... commonly authorized by
their membership to spend dues on extra-workplace activities thought to enhance the
union's strength internally and in the community." Friesen, supra note 2, at 603. Among
the plethora of extra-workplace activities unions engage in, Friesen enumerates lobbying
for labor and social legislation, union conventions, scholarships, charitable contributions
and organizing nonunion employees. Id For emphasis on the growth and significance of
union involvement in the legislative process, see Alan Hyde, Economic Labor Law v. Polit-
ical Labor Relations: Dilemmas for Liberal Legalism, 60 TEx. L. REv. 1, 3-4 (1981) (noting
that political advocacy is replacing private sector collective bargaining as parties' interests
become increasingly dependent on economic regulation by the federal government); see
also ARCHIBAID Cox, LAW AND THE NA-nONAL LABOR POLICY 107 (1960) ("It is difficult,
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that coerced payment of dues compromises their First Amendment right
to freedom of association.32
In Beck, the Supreme Court implicitly balanced the union majority's
right to full freedom of association 33 with respect to collective bargaining
against the financial core employees' right to refrain from engaging in
concerted activity.34 The Supreme Court concluded that financial core
employees may be compelled to contribute only that portion of dues ger-
if not impossible, to separate the economic and political functions of labor unions."). John
T. Delaney, professor of industrial relations at the University of Iowa, urges that "'[u]nions
more and more are being forced to try to defend themselves in the political arena because
they have been so unsuccessful in other arenas. ... Strikes and collective bargaining don't
seem to be working any more." Richard L. Berke, Bush Fires a Shot at Union Political
Spending, N.Y. TudEs, Apr. 19, 1992, at E3. Even the Supreme Court acknowledges that
costs "germane to [the union's] duties as collective bargaining agent" are not limited to the
"direct costs of negotiating and administering a collective-bargaining contract" but also
include "expenses of activities or undertakings normally or reasonably employed to imple-
ment or effectuate the duties of the union as exclusive bargaining representative of the
employees in the bargaining unit." Ellis v. Brotherhood of Ry., Airline & S.S. Clerks, 466
U.S. 435, 447-48 (1984).
32. See, e.g., Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209,234-35 (1977) (finding that
freedom of belief, which includes the right not to be forced to give financial support to an
ideological cause, is the "heart of the First Amendment"); Kenneth Cloke, Mandatory
Political Contributions and Union Democracy, 4 Imnus. REj. LJ. 527, 532 (1981) (explain-
ing how the interplay between the principles of union security and exclusive representation
engendered a limited right of minority members not to associate with the union majority);
Mark S. Pulliam, Union Security Clauses in Public Sector Labor Contracts and Abood v.
Detroit Board of Education:" A Dissent, 31 LAn. LJ. 539, 545 (1980) (arguing that com-
pelled financial support of a union interferes with the right of free association, even where
nonpolitical activities are involved).
Unions dispute on at least two grounds the notion that expenditure of compulsory dues
for political or ideological purposes oppresses the union-represented dues objector. First,
"majority rule," the cornerstone of democracy, permits eliciting contribution from dissent-
ers for the collective benefit of the majority. See Cloke, supra at 529 ("[Tjaxation for the
common good and majority rule are accepted principles of democracy and common prac-
tice in associations."). Second, compelled financial support is not equivalent to compelled
belief. See Steven Shiffrin, Government Speech, 27 UCLA L. REv. 565, 590-91 (1980)
(concluding that compulsory financing of union political endeavors "does not compel [ob-
jectors] to believe anything or to express anything, nor does it prohibit them from believing
or expressing anything").
33. Section 1 of the Taft-Hartley Act declares that it is the "policy of the United
States" to protect "the exercise by workers of full freedom of association ... for the pur-
pose of negotiating the terms and conditions of their employment or other mutual aid or
protection." 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1988).
34. Section 7 of the Taft-Hartley Act ensures that:
Employees shall have the right ... to engage in ... concerted activities for the
purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also
have the right to refrain from any or all of such activities except to the extent that
such right may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor or-
ganization as a condition of employment as authorized in section 158(a)(3) ....
29 U.S.C. § 157.
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mane to negotiation of the collective bargaining agreement, contract ad-
ministration, and grievance procedures.35 Expenditures for any other
purpose abrogate the union's duty of fair representation.36
The Beck decision evoked immense legal and political controversy.37
Confusion over the type of notice and the extent of financial information
that unions must provide to dues objectors prompted the Board to en-
gage in rulemaking for only the second time in its august history.3" De-
35. Communication Workers v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735,745 (1988); see also supra note 26.
Compare Lavigne v. Ontario Pub. Serv. Employees Union, 81 D.L.R. 4th 545 (1991)
(Supreme Court of Canada holding opposite of Beck).
36. See Beck, 487 U.S. at 735 (holding that a union's breach of its duty of fair repre-
sentation violates Section 8(b)(1)(a) of the Taft-Hartley Act). Initially, courts (as opposed
to the Board) created the duty of fair representation to combat racial discrimination by
unions against African-American laborers. Steele v. Louisville & Nash. R.R., 323 U.S. 192,
198-99, 203 (1944). Over the ensuing half-century, the duty expanded to cover a widening
variety of contexts, including contract negotiations, grievance and arbitrations procedure,
and administration of hiring halls. Breininger v. Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n, Local 6,
493 U.S. 67, 75 (1989) (hiring halls); Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 177 (1967) (arbitration/
grievance); Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330, 336-43 (1953) (contract negotia-
tions). The Supreme Court employs the duty of fair representation to require that the
union: (1) serve all members' interests without discrimination or hostility; (2) use complete
good faith and honesty in the exercise of discretion; and (3) avoid arbitrary conduct. Vaca,
386 U.S. at 177.
37. See Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, Union Security Agreements Under the National La-
bor Relations Act: the Statute, the Constitution, and the Court's Opinion in Beck, 27 HARv.
J. ON LEos. 51, 54-55 (1990) (arguing that the Court's interpretation of Section 8(a)(3) of
the NLRA in Beck "cannot be supported by direct examination of the statute's words,
administrative interpretations, or legislative history" and is "an inappropriate application
of the doctrine of avoiding constitutional questions"); Friesen, supra note 2, at 612 (cau-
tioning that Beck's restriction on employing union dues to fund political activities may
impede the operation of our democratic political system which depends on the pluralism of
interest groups to inform and persuade officials); Hartley, supra note 30, at 9 (demonstrat-
ing the mandatory applicability of operating principles derived from the Railway Labor
Act and public sector cases to Taft-Hartley dues objector cases); Renee L. Powell, Com-
ment, The State of Unions in America: "Chipping Away at the Union 'Block,"' 23 J. MAR-
SHALL L. REv. 707, 724-25 (1990); Lisa Rhode, Note, Section 8(a)(3) Limitation to the
Union's Use of Dues Equivalents: The Implications of Communication Workers v. Beck, 57
U. Cir. L. REv. 1567 (1989); Charles R. Virginia, Comment, Communication Workers v.
Becl Supreme Court Throws Unions Out on Street, 57 FORDHAM L. REv. 665, 670 (1989)
(noting the avoidance of constitutional issues in Beck).
"The Supreme Court's opinion in Beck affects thousands of bargaining units and collec-
tive-bargaining agreements, and labor organizations already have begun to set up proce-
dures to deal with the Court's new interpretation of the duty of fair representation
articulated in Beck." NLRB Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and Oral Argument on En-
forcing Beck v. Communications Workers of America, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 184, at
D-2 (Sept. 22, 1992) [hereinafter NLRB Notice of Proposed Rulemaking].
38. See NLRB Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, supra note 37, at D-1 to -12. The
proposed rules met with instant reaction:
In a move that some say could determine the future of compulsory union mem-
bership in 29 states, the National Labor Relations Board yesterday voted to en-
gage in substantive rulemaking for only the second time in its history to
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spite the proposed rules, the Board anticipates that substantial litigation
will ensue to refine categories of rebatable expenditures.39 Litigation will
tax both unions and dues objectors,40 as unions seek to attract new mem-
bers by exploring novel and questionably fundable ventures, such as
advertising.
The financial implications of the Beck decision for unions are discerni-
ble from the trial court's finding that seventy-nine percent of compulsory
dues were allocated to activities unrelated to collective bargaining and
contract administration. 41 Furthermore, because the Supreme Court
does not similarly require corporations to accommodate dissenting share-
holders,42 the union's main adversary in the political arena gains an unfair
determine how much financial information labor organizations must provide
members about their activities."
Frank Swoboda, Labor Board to Address Dues Issue, WASH. POST, May 5, 1992, at Cl.
Board Chairman James Stevens explained that the impetus behind the rulemaking
stemmed from "a need for a comprehensive policy on the issue." Board Hears Debate on
Union Obligations to Inform Employees of Rights Under Beck, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA)
No. 50, at AA-1 (Mar. 17, 1993). The only other instance of Board rulemaking involved
the determination of appropriate bargaining units in the health care industry. The process
of rulemaking stretched over a two year period. Although the medical industry challenged
the Board's capacity to engage in rulemaking in American Hospital Ass'n v. NLRB, 111 S.
Ct. 1539 (1991), the Supreme Court affirmed the Board's right to promulgate substantive
rules. Id. at 1541; see also NLRB Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, supra note 37, at D-2.
39. NLRB Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, supra note 37, at D-1.
40. Labor scholars predict that the actual number of employees who avail themselves
of the opportunity to object to dues payment will be small. See e.g., BERNARD TAYLOR &
FRANcIs WHrITEY, LABOR RELATIONS LAW 388 (5th ed. 1987) (extrapolating from data
that only .01% of United Auto Workers' membership participates in a voluntary rebate
program for political expenditures that has been in effect for several years); Dau-Schmidt,
supra note 37, at 53 & n.13. Furthermore, statisticians project that the reduction in fees
stemming from rebate will be minimal for most unions. See TAYLOR & WHrrNEY, supra,
at 388-89; Dau-Schmidt, supra note 37, at 53 n.14 ("Under the Ellis formula made applica-
ble to NLRA unions by Beck, the largest expenditures that unions cannot charge dissent-
ing employees are expenditures for organizing and political activities. These expenditures
have been estimated at 15% and 5% respectively for the average private sector union.");
Henkel & Wood, supra note 3, at 736. However, the litigation and bookkeeping expenses
incurred in resolving the complaints of dues objectors may substantially deplete the re-
sources of the labor movement. See Communications Workers v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735, 735
(1988); Brief of the AFL-CIO at 25, Beck (No. 86-367).
41. Beck v. Communication Workers, 776 F.2d 1187, 1192 (4th Cir. 1985), affd, 487
U.S. 735 (1988).
42. See Friesen, supra note 2, at 611-12 n. 26 ("Free speech and other rules generally
permit corporations to subsidize ideological messages out of funds contributed by uncon-
senting shareholders or ratepayers."); see also Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv.
Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530 (1980) (invalidating state law prohibiting monopoly utility from
including pro nuclear power missives in billing envelopes); First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435
U.S. 765 (1978) (finding that despite free speech and associational interests of dissenting
shareholders, prohibition of corporate contributions to influence a state ballot proposition
is unconstitutional); Theodora Holding Corp. v. Henderson, 257 A.2d 398 (Del. 1969)
1993]
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advantage.43 Speculation is also rampant on the impact of dues rebate on
political funding.44
Apart from predominately remunerative considerations, the executive
branch has manipulated Beck rights as a potent political pawn. 45 Deem-
ing Beck symbolic of the "renewed spirit of Jeffersonian reform sweeping
through this nation today[,]" President Bush issued an Executive Order
mandating that federal contractors notify workers of their right to dues
refund.46 President Clinton rescinded the order as "distinctly anti-union"
on the grounds that it failed to notify workers of any other rights pro-
tected by the NLRA.47
The shift in presidential policy illuminates the significance of Beck
rights as symbolic of union sentiment. 48 Waiver of Beck rights would en-
able unions to expand coffers and streamline accounting;49 but, above all,
(finding that a closely held corporation will not be dissolved because of charitable contri-
butions made over the objection of minority shareholders).
43. Friesen, supra note 2, at 611-12.
44. Although unions and corporations may not donate directly to political campaigns,
they may make contributions to political parties. Newspaper reports highlight the contro-
versy over Beck related laws as protective of workers' free speech rights or motivated to
undercut "[lIabor's political clout." William Murchison, Reshaping Labor-Management
Relations, WAsH. Tnms, Apr. 22, 1992, at 1; see also Making Unions Accountable, DE-
TRorr NEws, April 16,1992, at 3 ("No one should be forced to support political causes with
which he or she is in disagreement as a condition of employment.").
45. See President Bush's Statement on Signing Executive Order, April 13,1992, Daily
Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 72, at F-1 (Apr. 14, 1992) [hereinafter President Bush's statement].
Pursuant to Executive Order 12836, President Clinton rescinded Bush's executive order
requiring that federal contractors notify employees of their Beck rights. Clinton Rescinds
Orders on Beck, "Open Bidding," Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 21, at summary (Feb. 3,
1993) [hereinafter Clinton Rescinds Orders].
46. Executive Order Requiring Federal Contractors to Notify Workers of Rights
Under Beck v. Communication Workers, Signed by President Bush, April 13, 1992, Daily
Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 72, at D-1 (Apr. 14, 1992). In his accompanying remarks, President
Bush linked his vision of union democracy with Jeffersonian democracy by quoting
Thomas Jefferson: "To compel a man to furnish contributions of money for the propaga-
tion of opinions which he disbelieves and abhors is sinful and tyrannical." President Bush's
statement, supra note 45, at F-1. At one point, White House officials estimated that Presi-
dent Bush's Beck order could truncate as much as $2.4 billion annually in union money
available for "soft" political activities such as registration drives. Union officials, however,
deride that figure as "wildly inflated," contending that unions spend less than $1 billion
yearly on such activities. Richard L. Berke, Bush Fires a Shot at Union Political Spending,
N.Y. Timus, Apr. 19, 1992, § 4, at 3.
47. Clinton Rescinds Orders, supra note 45, at summary.
48. AFL-CIO President Lane Kirkland heralded President Clinton's recision of Bush's
executive order as "the first symbol of a renewed commitment to the national labor policy
set out in the federal labor laws and to the fair and vigorous enforcement of those laws."
Id.
49. Cf. Dau-Schmidt, supra note 37, at 53. "As a result of the Beck decision, the
bookkeeping and litigation expenses required to resolve the complaints of dissenters may
prove a significant drain on the resources of the American labor movement." Id The
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each employee's individual waiver of her Beck rights would constitute a
vote of confidence for unionization and a personalized commitment to
solidarity.
Whereas Beck rights are most valuable to financial core employees em-
ployed under union security contracts, the right to resign is usually exer-
cised by union members during a strike of their employer." In Pattern
Makers' League v. NLRB,51 the Supreme Court held that restrictions in
union constitutions on membership resignation are inconsistent with the
federal labor policy of voluntary unionism. 2 Subsequent to Pattern Mak-
ers', union members can avoid union discipline by resigning before cross-
ing over during a strike. 3
Although Pattern Makers' arguably supports the concept of voluntary
unionism 4 by protecting the employee's right to refrain from engaging in
concerted activity, the holding dramatically diminishes the union's effec-
tiveness as a bargaining agent by withdrawing its most effective tool for
preserving union solidarity during a strike period: the threat of disci-
pline. 5 Consequently, enforceable waivers of the right to resign would
provide an alternative means of replenishing the ultimate weapon 56 labor
union shop and checkoff are clearly vital to the planning and administration of a union's
financial affairs; checkoff provisions further spare costs of collecting dues from reluctant
members. Not surprisingly, employers frequently balk at inclusion of such clauses in the
collective bargaining agreement because they are "'not going to [give] aid and comfort [to]
the union."' H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99, 101 (1970).
50. See Powell, supra note 37, at 717-20 (discussing the restriction on a union's author-
ity to discipline members).
51. 473 U.S. 95 (1985).
52. Id. at 107. "Congress in 1947 sought to eliminate completely any requirement that
the employee maintain full union membership. Therefore, the Board was justified in con-
cluding that by restricting the right of employees to resign, League Law 13 impairs the
policy of voluntary unionism." I& (footnote omitted).
53. Id. at 106. "By allowing employees to resign from a union at any time, § 8(a)(3)
protects the employee whose views come to diverge from those of his union." Id; see also
James G. Pope, Labor and the ConstitutionL From Abolition to Deindustrialization, 65 Tax.
L. Rav. 1071, 1125 (1987) ("[ln Pattern Makers' League v. NLRB, the Supreme Court
upheld an NLRB ruling that members could avoid discipline simply by resigning from the
union immediately prior to crossing a picket line." (footnotes omitted)).
54. For explanation of the concept of voluntary unionism, see infra notes 86-89 and
accompanying text.
55. James H. Clark, Jr., Comment, Pattern Makers v. NLRB: the Supreme Court
Removes the Resignation Restriction as a Method to Achieve Union Solidarity, 22 WILLAM.
Br L. REv. 503, 505 (1986); see also MANCUR OLSON, THE Looic OF COLLEcTrvE Ac-
MrION: PUBLIC GOOD AND T THEORY OF GRoUPs 68 (1971) ("By far the most important
single factor enabling large, national unions to survive was that membership in those un-
ions, and support of the strikes they called, was to a great degree compulsory." (emphasis
added)).
56. NOEL A. LEvIN, SuccEssmUL LABOR RELArIONs 281 (1978); Clyde Summers, Dis-
ciplinary Powers of Unions, 3 INDUs. & LAB. REL. REv. 483,495 (1950) ("Strikebreaking is
1993]
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employs in disputes with management: the strike or threat of strike. 7 Af-
fording employees the option to commit contractually to remain with the
union in times of individual crises builds confidence in unions and incen-
tive to arrive at mutual consensus to benefit the group as a whole.
58
The Board's decision in Lockheed provides that the waivability of Beck
rights and resignation rights is determined by (1) the nature of the right
uniformly considered sufficient reason for expulsion whether or not there is an express
prohibition, for it undercuts the union's principal weapon and defeats the economic objec-
tive for which the union exists."); see also NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175,
181 (1967) ("The economic strike against the employer is the ultimate weapon in labor's
arsenal for achieving agreement upon its terms.").
57. See David Abraham, Individual Autonomy and Collective Empowerment in Labor
Law: Union Membership Resignations and Strikebreaking in the New Economy, 63 N.Y.U.
L. RE,. 1268, 1304 (1988) ("It has been a stable assumption in American labor law that a
union cannot compel an employer to bargain with it, let alone make any concessions to it,
unless it can apply economic pressure and do so effectively."). For both union and em-
ployer, "[t]he presence of economic weapons in reserve, and their actual exercise on occa-
sion by the parties, is part and parcel of the system that the Wagner and Taft-Hartley Acts
have recognized," NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477, 489 (1960),
notwithstanding "the most serious effect upon individual workers and productive enter-
prises." Id.
To offset "weapons," such as the strike, in the union's arsenal of economic pressure, the
employer can, depending on the circumstances, operate with permanent replacements,
NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938); initiate a preemptive lockout,
American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300 (1965); subcontract out work, Hawaii
Meat Co. v. NLRB, 321 F.2d 397 (9th Cir. 1963); close down the plant entirely, Darlington
Mfg. Co., 165 N.L.R.B. 1074 (1967), enforced, 397 F.2d 760 (4th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393
U.S. 1023 (1969); "or simply let[ ] time, financial pressures, and adverse publicity wear
down the union's bargaining position," Abraham, supra, at 1304 n.161.
58. Thus the argument of classical liberal theorists who opposed a constitutional right
to strike is wielded to enhance the right to strike. The classical liberal argument is epito-
mized by Professor Corwin's estimation that ... [l]iberty is an individual matter; for as
[Edmund] Burke remarks in the Reflections, '[Wlhen men act in concert, liberty is
power."""). Pope, supra note 53, at 1077-78 (quoting E. CoRWIN, TOTAL WAR AND THE
CONSTITUTION 91 (1947) (quoting EDWARD BURKE, REFLECrIONS ON THE REVOLUrION
IN FRANcr.)). More cynically, one can discount the element of "freedom" in freedom of
contract and focus on the factor of "contract." Solidarity is no longer built on mutual
feelings of trust and personal choice, but by the external, binding control of a legal
instrument.
Moving toward a middle ground, one can appreciate how this appeal to individualism is
a subtle attenuation of the indigenously American concept of democracy that has been
incorporated into the brand of "industrial democracy" protected by the labor statutes. The
watchwords of American democracy are "liberty and equality." Whereas contemporary
French republicanism embraced "fraternit" as well, fraternity is conspicuously absent
from the pantheon of American virtues. As one scholar has remarked, "[tihis individual-
ism, which is neither fraternal nor mean, is still the deepest impulse of our democracy.
Americans cling to it because their common sense tells them that the expanded sense of
brotherliness or sisterliness is highly unreliable...." Eva T.H. Brann, Democratic Distinc-
tion, KEY REP., Summer 1993, at 2, 2. "Even Jefferson, probably the most radical of the
major Founders, evidently held that it was safer to rely on the legal protection of a sound
constitution than on the hyperbolic sentiments of expanded family feeling." Id.
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and (2) the method of waiver. 59 Although the Beck opinion is couched in
terms of statutory interpretation,6" free association values embedded in
the labor statute61 strongly influenced the Supreme Court's ruling.62 The
waivability of Beck rights, therefore, hinges on the waivability of the right
to withhold financial support, as conferred by Sections 7 and 8(a)(3) of
the Taft-Hartley Act, to the extent that the right of freedom of associa-
tion63 is not impinged."
59. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local 2088, 302 N.L.R.B. 322, 328-29 (1991)
(analyzing waivability of the right to revoke dues checkoff authorization by examining the
language and legislative history to determine the nature of right and the method of
waiver).
60. See Communications Workers v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735, 762 (1988). The Court stated:
We therefore decline to construe the language of § 8(a)(3) [of Taft-Hartley] dif-
ferently from that of § 2, Eleventh [of the Railway Labor Act] on the theory that
our construction of the latter provision was merely constitutionally expedient.
Congress enacted the two provisions for the same purpose, eliminating "free rid-
ers," and that purpose dictates our construction of § 8(a)(3) no less than it did
that of § 2, Eleventh, regardless of whether the negotiation of union-security
agreements under the NLRA partakes of governmental action.
Id.
61. The national labor policy rests on the principle of "protecting the exercise by
workers of full freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of representa-
tives of their own choosing." 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1988). Referring to rights granted by Sec-
tion 1, id., and Section 7, see supra note 34, of the Taft-Hartley Act, Professor Summers
elaborates on how "Congress protected these rights, rooted in the first amendment, against
private action, against encroachments by employers exercising private power." Clyde W.
Summers, The Privatization of Personal Freedoms and Enrichment of Democracy: Some
Lessons from Labor Law, 1986 U. ILL. L. Rv. 689, 697.
62. See Hartley, supra note 30, at 2 ("[Ihe threshold task is to demonstrate that
although most of the pre-Beck dues objector litigation [which the Beck Court relied upon]
nominally focused on statutory interpretation, constitutional values largely determined the
cases' outcomes."); see also Friesen, supra note 2, at 608 ("Although the private sector rule
is formally cast as a construction of federal collective bargaining law, the doctrine in both
private and public sectors really rests upon the theory that the use of members' money to
promote causes with which they disagree offends notions of free speech and association.").
63. In NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958), the Court clearly articulated the right
of association that is derived from the First Amendment protection of freedom of speech
and assembly:
Effective advocacy of both public and private points of view, particularly con-
troversial ones, is undeniably enhanced by group association, as this Court has
more than once recognized by remarking upon the close nexus between the free-
doms of speech and assembly. It is beyond debate that freedom to engage in
association for the advancement of beliefs and ideas is an inseparable aspect of
the "liberty" assured by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
which embraces freedom of speech. Of course, it is immaterial whether the be-
liefs sought to be advanced by association pertain to political, economic, religious
or cultural matters, and state action which may have the effect of curtailing the
freedom to associate is subject to the closest scrutiny.
ML at 460-61 (citations omitted).
64. Lockheed, 302 N.L.R.B. 322, 327 (1991). The Board stated:
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In contrast to Beck rights, the right to resign is an unenumerated right,
presumed to subside in the right to refrain from engaging in concerted
activity pursuant to Section 7 of the Taft-Hartley Act.6" The nature of
resignation rights as not purely economic66 indicates that apart from stat-
utory considerations, their waivability will be influenced by liberty con-
cerns, 67 the doctrine of unconscionability, 6  and the Thirteenth
Amendment's prohibition against involuntary servitude.69 Illustration of
[I]t can hardly be disputed that Section 7 protects both the right to refrain from
belonging to a union and the right to refrain from contributing money to it, ex-
cept to the extent that the proviso to Section 8(a)(3) of the Act permits an em-
ployee to be required to pay dues under a contractual provision as there defined.
Id.
65. Section 7 of the Taft-Hartley Act affords employees the right to refrain from join-
ing or assisting a labor organization and from engaging in concerted activities for mutual
aid and protection. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1988). The right to assist or not to join a labor union
has been interpreted to include the right to resign. The Supreme Court in Pattern Makers'
League v. NLRB, 473 U.S. 95 (1985), remarked:
The right to join or not to join a labor union includes the right to resign, and
§ 8(b)(1)(A) forbids unions to interfere with that right except to the extent, if
any, that such interference is permitted by the proviso to that section, which pre-
serves the union's right to prescribe its own rules with respect to the acquisition
or retention of membership.
Id. at 116 (White, J., concurring).
The Petitioner union in Pattern Makers' argued unsuccessfully that the Taft-Hartley
Act's legislative history indicated that Congress made a considered decision not to protect
members' right to resign. Id. at 110. Section 8(c) of the House Bill included a specific "bill
of rights" for labor union members. H.R. 3020,80th Cong., 1st Sess. § 8(c) (1947). The bill
of rights contained a provision rendering it an unfair labor practice to "deny to any [union]
member the right to resign from the organization at any time." Id. § 8(c)(4). In compari-
son, the Senate bill did not list particular employee rights, but expressed in more general
terms that it was an unfair labor practice to "restrain or coerce" employees in the exercise
of their Section 7 rights. Id. § 8(b)(1)(A) (Senate version). The Taft-Hartley Act adopted
the more general language of the Senate Bill rather than the specific prohibitions detailed
in the House version. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)(A). The Petitioners in Pattern Makers'
reasoned that the omission of the House provision evidenced an express decision by Con-
gress not to protect the "right to resign." Pattern Makers', 473 U.S. at 110. The Supreme
Court declined to accept Petitioner's interpretation of the legislative history. Id. Instead,
the Court determined that "[t]he 'right to resign' apparently was included in the original
House bill to protect workers unable to resign because of 'closed shop' agreements....
Because the closed shop was outlawed by the Taft-Hartley Act, it is not surprising that
Congress thought it unnecessary explicitly to preserve the right to resign." Id at 110-11
(citation omitted).
66. As Professor Summers has criticized, "preoccupation with the economic function
of labor law too often causes the constitutional values to be overlooked or not recognized."
Summers, supra note 61, at 701.
67. See id. ("The National Labor Relations Act is too often viewed solely as striking a
balance between union and employers rather than as a statute primarily protecting the
personal freedoms of individual employees and extending democratic procedures to indus-
trial life.").
68. See discussion infra notes 341-53 and accompanying text.
69. See discussion infra notes 318-40 and accompanying text.
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the language and circumstances comprising "clear and unmistakable"
waiver, as endorsed by Lockheed and later Board opinions, informs the
method of waiver of Beck rights and resignation rights. °
This Comment extends the reasoning of Lockheed to conclude that
Beck rights and resignation rights are waivable, provided conditions of
notice, consideration, and, in the case of resignation rights, duration, are
satisfied. Part I chronicles the discovery of dues checkoff authorization
as an independent source of dues obligation. The intersection of the stat-
utory policy of voluntary unionism with common law contract principles
delineates the waivability of the right to revoke dues checkoff authoriza-
tion and other membership rights."1 Part II explores the source of Beck
rights and the circumstances that permit their waiver. Part III examines
the elusive nature of the right to resign through the lens of statutory anal-
ysis and the prism of Supreme Court and Board precedent. A focus on
the Thirteenth Amendment prohibition against involuntary servitude and
the doctrine of unconscionability indicates the necessity for durational re-
straints on waiver. F'mally, this Comment concludes that the Board's en-
dorsement of "clear and unmistakable" waiver of the right to revoke dues
checkoff authorization greatly expands the capacity of individual contract
to affect the union-member relationship. Paradoxically, and perhaps un-
wittingly, the Board has created a means to decrease its own involvement
in the regulation of the union-member relationship.72
I. POST-RESIGNATION SuRViVAILrry OF DUES CHMCKOFF
AUTHORIZATION
A. Rejection of an Erroneous Interpretation of Contract Law
Dues checkoff originally occurred in tandem with union security agree-
ments.73 Unions and employers considered dues checkoff mutually desir-
70. A related approach might have been to examine whether the rights to be waived
would be deemed public or private. In the labor context, some rights cannot be waived by
the individual. Professor Klare, however, has argued persuasively that the publiclprivate
distinction is a mere tautology. See generally Karl E. Kare, The PublicPrivate Distinction
in Labor Law, 130 U. PA. L. Rlv. 1358 (1982).
71. See Lockheed, 302 N.L.R.B. 322, 324-28 (1991).
72. Despite protests to the contrary, over the last decade the Board increasingly en-
meshed itself in the regulation of internal union affairs. See generally Roger C. Hartley,
NLRB Control of Union Discipline and the Myth of Nonintervention, 16 VT. L. REv. 11
(1991). A thesis of this Comment is that individual waiver of resignation rights and Beck
rights would diminish the Board's control over the union-member relationship, returning it
to the hands of the parties directly involved.
73. Lockheed, 302 N.L.R.B. at 326. The Board noted that "dues checkoff was usually
ancillary to union-security agreements, which required some form of union membership as
a condition of employment." Id.
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able for several reasons. First, unions discovered that absence of checkoff
diverted time and resources away from "constructive" contract adminis-
tration to individual dues collection.74 Second, collection activities at the
plant site posed enormous potential for impinging on the employer's effi-
ciency and productivity.7' Finally, as employees laboring under union se-
curity agreements must pay dues or suffer employer discharge, the
expediency of dues checkoff as a method of ensuring timely payment
helped obviate the pressure of discharging employees.76
Historically, dues checkoff agreements affected payment of an entire
panoply of financial obligations to unions: membership dues, initiation
fees, fines, and assessments.77 Furthermore, checkoff agreements were
predominantly automatic and did not require individual employee con-
sent.7' Following World War II, collective bargaining agreements incor-
porating dues checkoff clauses without underlying union security
provisions emerged.79
74. Hearings on S. 55 & SJ. Res. 22 Before the Senate Comm. on Labor & Public
Welfare, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 1151-52 (1947) (statement of Lee Pressman, General Counsel
of CIO) [hereinafter Senate Hearings].
75. Id.
76. Id. In testimony before the Senate Labor Committee, CIO General Counsel
Pressman declared that:
[M]ost employers ... prefer the check-off with or without union security to union
security without the check-off [as] indicated by the issue which has been posed
with some frequency in recent months in collective-bargaining negotiations in
which the employer has offered a universal check-off in preference to union se-
curity, contending that he [the employer] prefers the relatively easy, automatic,
mechanical process of the check-off to being forced to deal with problems relating
to discharge of recalcitrant individual employees.
Id. at 1151.
77. Lockheed, 302 N.L.R.B. at 326.
78. See H.R. REP. No. 245,80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947), reprinted in 1 N.L.R.B. LEGIS-
LATivE HIsToRY OF THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIoNs ACT, 1947 at 369 [hereinafter
1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY] (stating that over one-half of the 1,300,000 workers in nonmanu-
facturing industries participate in automatic dues checkoff; aircraft engines, automobiles,
cigarettes and tobacco, hosiery, electrical machinery, leather (except shoes and gloves) and
steel (basic) are among the manufacturing industries whose workers are largely covered by
automatic checkoff provisions).
Automatic consent provisions were not blanketly utilized. See BUREAU OF LABOR STA-
TISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, BULL. No. 865, EXTENT OF COLLECriVE BAROAININo AND
UNION RECOGNITION, 1945 (1946) (23 percent of the 39 percent of employees covered by
union security agreements are subject to automatic dues checkoff provisions). Rather, col-
lective bargaining agreements usually tailored the consent requirement to the form of
union security utilized. For instance, maintenance-of-membership agreements, which grant
employees the choice of union membership, similarly tended to include optional dues
checkoff provisions. Senate Hearings, supra note 74, at 1151-52 (testimony of William
Green, President of the AFL).
79. Lockheed, 302 N.L.R.B. at 326; see also Senate Hearings, supra note 74, at 1166
(testimony of Secretary of Labor Schwellenbach) (explaining that checkoff "may be com-
1993] Waiver of Beck Rights 177
The currently operable law pertaining to dues checkoff authorization
was enacted as part of the 1947 Taft-Hartley amendments to Section
302(c)(4) of the NLRA.80 The principal thrust of Section 302 of the Taft-
Hartley Act was to curtail unions' ability to exact so called "welfare
funds" from employers.81 Congress expressed concern that union leaders
had been deploying large sums of employer contributions toward institu-
bined with a standard union security provision or it may stand alone in lieu of any other
union security provision"). There is some evidence that contracts containing checkoff pro-
visions but lacking union security provisions predated World War II. The National War
Labor Board, which decided labor disputes during World War 11, ordered inclusion of
checkoff provisions in some contracts instead of union security provisions. See In re Bower
Roller Bearing Co., 10 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 981 (N.L.R.B., Mar. 11, 1942).
80. Section 302(c)(4) of the Taft-Hartley Act originated from a floor amendment by
Senator Ball to the Senate bill, S. 1126. The Senate report, filed by several senators includ-
ing Senator Ball and Senator Taft, comments sparingly that the amendment "prevents the
check-off of union dues unless authorized in writing by the individual employee. Such
authorization may be irrevocable for the period of contract, which is the usual form of
check-off today." S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 52 (1947) (supplemental views),
reprinted in 1 LEISLATVE HisTORy, supra note 78, at 458. The final amendment, as
passed, also provided for annual revocation of authorization. 29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(4) (1988).
A parallel dues checkoff provision was introduced in the House of Representatives.
H.R. 3020 would have outlawed all employer deduction of union fees, dues and assess-
ments, except where deductions were "voluntarily authorized in writing by such employee
and such authorization is revocable by the employee at any time upon thirty days' written
notice to the employer." H.R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 21, reprinted in 1 LEGISLATV E
HIsToRy, supra note 78, at 51. The House Report on this provision categorized it as "a
form of 'union security' that is in effect in many plants, where it has proved popular with
employers, employees, and unions, saving time and trouble for all of them." H.R. REP.
No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 29 (1947), reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note
78, at 320.
The contents of the Conference Report to H.R. 3020 ultimately became the bulk of the
Taft-Hartley amendments. In enacting current Section 302(c)(4), however, Congress
adopted the Ball amendment to S. 1126 in lieu of the House provision. H.R. CoNm. RP.
No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 66-67 (1947), reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra
note 78, at 570-71.
For a cogent analysis of the Taft-Hartley Act from the vantage point of a labor historian,
see JAMES R. GREEN, THE WoRLD OF THE WORKER: LABOR IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY
AMERICA 198-200 (1980) (outlining how the Taft-Hartley Act eliminated many of the
rights and protections unions had gleaned during the New Deal and World War I). One
significant impact of the Taft-Hartley Act was the expansion of the NLRB's role in policing
labor-management relations. Id. The Act created the position of General Counsel of the
Board, vesting the General Counsel with discretion to sue unions for various unfair labor
practices. Id. As Green summarizes, "the NLRB, the product of labor's Magna Carta
[referring to the NLRA] in 1936, could now be used against unions as well as against em-
ployers. Administrative law, like judicial law, reflects the alignment of class forces, and in
1947 the pendulum of forces was swinging against organized workers." Id. at 198.
81. Lockheed, 302 N.L.R.B. at 325. Congress apparently considered John L. Lewis,
eminent former president of the United Mine Workers, the most insidious extorter of "wel-
fare funds," and therefore the prime target of Section 302(a). The floor debates on Section
302 are riddled with invective leveled against Lewis. See, e.g., 93 CONo. Rnc. 3713 (1947),
reprinted in 1 LEoSLATrVE HISTORY, supra note 78, at 800 ("Arrogant labor leaders such
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tional ends, rather than directly ameliorating employment conditions, as
promised. 2 Reflecting congressional intent, the revised structure of Sec-
tion 302(c)(4) bars direct payments to unions, with certain enumerated
exceptions, including dues checkoff authorization.' The checkoff provi-
sion of the Taft-Hartley Act consists of two stipulations. First, checkoff is
no longer automatic; employees are required to execute individual dues
checkoff authorizations.' Second, the duration of checkoff authoriza-
tions are conscribed to a period not to exceed one year, with employees
afforded the option of revoking their authorizations at regular intervals. 85
The Taft-Hartley limitations on checkoff authorization and duration of
checkoff can be viewed as a response to the tenor of the era that initiated
the concept of "voluntary unionism."86 Voluntary unionism means that
the employee is free to elect whether or not to support a union, except
where union security agreements compel contribution.' In its 1947 mod-
ifications to the NLRA, Congress for the first time gave employees the
right to refrain from belonging to a union.88 The dues checkoff provision
of the Taft-Hartley Act similarly facilitates the newfound right to refrain
from union association. By affording employees both the option of dues
checkoff and regular opportunities to reconsider and rescind checkoff au-
as John L. Lewis have set themselves up as super-governments contrary to the welfare of
the country."); see also S. REP. No. 105, supra note 80, at 458.
82. Representative Hugh A. Meade described the purpose of H.R. 3020, the House
version of later-enacted Section 302, in his extended remarks:
The bill would forbid an employer to pay royalties, taxes, and other exactions
to unions in the guise of welfare funds or otherwise.
This section speaks for itself and was brought about by Mr. Lewis' demand for
a 5 cents a ton royalty for a welfare fund for miners. Although that fund now
contains several million dollars, not one dime was paid out of it to the widows and
children in the recent Centralia coal-mine disaster.
93 Coro. REc. A2012 (1947), reprinted in 1 LEoistLArrvE HISTORY, supra note 78, at 869.
83. 29 U.S.C. § 186 (1988).
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. See Pattern Makers' League v. NLRB, 473 U.S. 95, 104-07 (1985) (finding that the
1947 Taft-Hartley amendments incorporated the policy of voluntary unionism into the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act); see also Lockheed, 302 N.L.R.B. 322, 327 (1991). The Board
in Lockheed stated:
In its 1947 modification of Section 7 of the Act, Congress gave employees the
right to refrain from engaging in the activities specified in that section. Because
those activities include "join[ing], or assist[ing] labor organizations," it can hardly
be disputed that Section 7 protects both the right to refrain from belonging to a
union and the right to refrain from contributing money to it, except to the extent
that the proviso to Section 8(a)(3) of the Act permits an employee to be required
to pay dues under a contractual provision as there defined.
Id.
87. Id.
88. 29 U.S.C. § 158.
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thorization, Section 302(c)(4) ensures employees freedom to choose
whether or not to participate in checkoff.89 The statute as passed in 1947,
however, remained ambiguous regarding the impact of resignation from
union membership when resignation occurs outside of the prescribed win-
dow periods for revoking dues checkoff authorization. Resolution of this
and other statutory ambiguities was left to the determination of the
Board, the primary agency charged with interpretation of the NLRA.90
B. Rejection of an Erroneous Interpretation of Contract Law
The Board struggled during ensuing decades to refine and apply the
statutory requirements of dues checkoff to individual cases of authoriza-
tion.91 Originally, the Board adopted a contract approach to checkoff
authorizations, scrutinizing the language of authorizations to discern the
relationship between dues checkoff authorization and union membership,
as agreed to by the employee.' In examining the effect of resignation
89. For text of statute, see supra note 11.
90. See NLRB v. National Thuck Drivers Local Union 449, 353 U.S. 87, 96 (1956)
("The function of striking [a] balance [that will] effectuate national labor policy is often a
difficult and delicate responsibility, which the Congress committed primarily to the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board ... ."); see also Pattern Makers' 473 U.S. at 114. The Pattern
Makers' Court stated that "[t]he Board has the primary responsibility for applying "'the
general provisions of the Act to the complexities of industrial life.""' I. (quoting Ford
Motor Co. v. NLRB, 441 U.S. 488, 496 (1979) (quoting NLRB v. Eric Resistor Corp., 373
U.S. 221, 236 (1963))).
91. See, e.g., American Tel. & Tel. Co., 303 N.L.R.B. 944, 945 (1991) (holding that
where employee explicitly authorized continuation of dues checkoff even after resignation,
neither employer's continued checkoff nor union's continued acceptance of dues were ille-
gal); Cardinal Sys., 259 N.L.R.B. 456, 457 (1981) (holding that employer's solicitation of
employees' revocation of checkoff authorizations is illegal); Frito-Lay, Inc., 243 N.L.R.B.
137, 139 (1979) (holding that the union and employer were justified in considering authori-
zations still valid where employees did not revoke their authorizations during allotted es-
cape periods); Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 175 N.L.R.B. 873, 874 (1969) (holding
that the right of revocation is not automatically created upon election culminating in decer-
tification of the incumbent or certification of the new union; the employer must check off
dues until the present contract expires); William Wolf Bakery, Inc., 122 N.L.R.B. 630, 631
(1958) (explaining that as- a matter of comity, the Board adopts the Department of Justice
interpretation of the term "membership" in Section 302).
92. See e.g., San Diego County Dist. Council of Carpenters (Campbell Indus.), 243
N.L.R.B. 147, 149 (1979); United Steelworkers, Local 7450 (Asarco Inc.), 246 N.L.R.B.
878, 881 (1979); see also Local Lodge 2045, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers
(Eagle Signal), 268 N.L.R.B. 635, 637 (1984) ("It is established Board law that a dues-
checkoff authorization, or wage assignment as it is called in this case, is a contract between
an employee and his employer .... ).
The Sixth Circuit opinion in NLRB v. United States Postal Service, 833 F.2d 1195 (6th
Cir. 1987) [hereinafter Postal Service], identified Campbell Industries as the seminal case
containing the Board's reasoning with respect to continuation of checkoff post member-
ship resignation. Id. at 1200. The Sixth Circuit categorized the Board's rational as "essen-
tially an analysis based on contract principles." Id. The Court's opinion further noted that
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from union membership on continuance of dues checkoff authorization,
the NLRB adhered to the "quid pro quo" analysis of Machinists Local
Lodge 2045, International Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers (Ea-
gle Signal). In Eagle Signal, the Board determined that where the dues
checkoff authorization form expressly designated dues payment to be the
quid pro quo for union membership, resignation would automatically re-
voke dues checkoff authorization.94 The quid pro quo approach focused
on the express language of the dues authorization agreement. 95 If the
agreement indicated that dues were "in consideration of the benefits re-
ceived and to be received as a result of... membership in the union,"96
then the payment of dues was deemed to be a quid pro quo for union
membership.97 Where the payment of dues was considered a quid pro
quo for union membership, the dues checkoff authorization would expire
upon the employee's resignation.9" The authorization would terminate,
regardless of when the employee gave notice of her revocation of dues
authorization.
99
The Eagle Signal approach gradually came under disfavor, beginning
with opinions by the federal courts of appeals.1"' The United States
Courts of Appeals for the Sixth and Ninth Circuits denounced the Eagle
"Campbell Industries laid great stress on the express language of the dues authorization
agreement, which included a recitation that the dues were 'in consideration of the benefits
received and to be received by me as a result of my membership in the Union."' Id.
(quoting Campbell Industries, 243 N.L.R.B. at 149).
93. 268 N.L.R.B. 635 (1984). Although Eagle Signal loaned its name to the so-called
"Eagle Signal doctrine," two previous Board decisions, Campbell Industries and Frito-Lay,
actually provided the generative source for the quid pro quo approach. See NLRB v.
United States Postal Serv., 827 F.2d 548, 553 (9th Cir. 1987) [hereinafter Dalton] (stating
that the Eagle Signal doctrine originated in Campbell Industries and Frito-Lay; see also
Lockheed, 302 N.L.R.B. 322, 324 (1991). But cf Postal Service, 833 F.2d at 1200 (citing
Asarco Inc. and Campbell Industries as the cases relied upon by Eagle Signal in deriving
the Eagle Signal mode of analysis).
94. Eagle Signal, 268 N.L.R.B. at 637. The Board opined:
It is established Board law... that a resignation of union membership ordina-
rily does not revoke a checkoff authorization. However, a resignation will, by
operation of law, revoke a checkoff authorization, even absent a revocation re-
quest, where the authorization itself makes payment of dues a quid pro quo for
union membership.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
95. See Postal Service, 833 F.2d at 1200.
96. Campbell Industries, 243 N.L.R.B. at 149.
97. Postal Service, 833 F.2d at 1200.
98. Eagle Signal, 268 N.L.R.B. at 637.
99. Id. Under the quid pro quo approach, resignation terminated dues checkoff re-
gardless of whether (1) the employee executed a formal revocation request; and (2) the
request was timely, i.e., within the time frame set forth in the authorization form. ld.
100. See Dalton, 827 F.2d 548 (9th Cir. 1987); Postal Service, 833 F.2d at 1195.
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Signal doctrine as an unacceptable construction of contract principles. 10 1
The criticism of Eagle Signal and its predecessors centered on confusion
over the link between consideration and the obligation to perform.102
101. Postal Service, 833 F.2d at 1200 (citing Dalton, 827 F.2d at 554-55 ("It is because
the Board based its decision entirely 'on an erroneous view of the requirements of contract
law' that the Ninth Circuit majority held that 'the Board has not given a reasoned basis for
its rule, nor does it represent a correct application of the law.")); Dalton, 827 F.2d at 554.
The courts of appeals further faulted the Board for its improper statutory construction.
Postal Service, 833 F.2d at 1197-1200; Dalton, 827 F.2d at 551-53. Since the employees in
both cases were employed by the Postal Service, the applicable checkoff provision was
Section 1205 of the Postal Reorganization Act (PRA), rather than Section 302(c)(4) of the
Taft-Hartley Act. Ld. In reaching its decisions, however, the Board had applied its inter-
pretation of the checkoff provision of the Taft-Hartley Act to the PRA, "brush[ing] aside
contentions that the differing language of the two laws was of any significance, and that the
legislative history indicated any Congressional intention contrary to the Board's view."
Postal Service, 833 F.2d at 1198. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
stressed the difference between the two statutes in general and the two checkoff provisions
in particular. Id. at 1198-1200. In its comparison of the PRA and Taft-Hartley, the court
singled out the fact that union security agreements are not permitted under the PRA. Id.
at 1199. The checkoff provision of the PRA thus provides the only means for the union to
predict future revenue and expenses. Id. The court considered of paramount importance
the fact that the PRA "explicitly permits the deduction of dues in situations'that would
unquestionably be illegal under the NLRA," including continuation of checkoff agree-
ments with non-exclusive bargaining representatives. Id. at 1199-1200 (citing United States
Postal Serv., 248 N.L.R.B. 5 (1980)).
The court further explained how, despite apparent similarity in the language of the two
provisions, they are "crucially different":
Section 302(c)(4) of the NLRA provides that an authorization "shall not be irrev-
ocable for a period of more than one year." The provision allows, but does not
require, an authorization to be irrevocable, and it places a maximum on the
length of permissible irrevocability. The PRA, in contrast, provides that the Pos-
tal Service will deduct dues from the pay of employees who have made "a written
assignment which shall be irrevocable for a period of more than one year." On its
face, section 1205 requires that any assignment made must be irrevocable for a
period up to a year.
Id. at 1199 (citations omitted).
102. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit described the fundamen-
tal flaw in the Eagle Signal approach as exemplified in the reasoning of Campbell
Industries:
The Board in Campbell apparently concluded that the employee's duty to as-
sign his wages to pay membership dues was conditioned on union membership.
Although the contract did not explicitly state that the employee's authorization
was conditioned on the employer's performance or tendering of performance,
such "constructive conditions of exchange" are freely implied.
But even this implied condition would not lead to the Board's result. Under
the contract, the employer promised to tender "the benefits received and to be
received" as a result of union membership. Because of the implied condition, if
the employer did not tender these benefits, the employee would no longer have a
duty to perform his end of the bargain; thus, the employee could revoke the au-
thorization. But the employer in Campbell did not fail to provide these benefits.
Instead, the employee unilaterally declined to accept them-he resigned. A
party's duty to perform even a wholly executory contract is not excused merely
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Under Eagle Signal, manipulation of the wording of the authorization
agreement alone could enable the employee to escape the contractual
agreement. 103 The employee could terminate checkoff upon resignation
outside the window period simply because the employee no longer de-
sired the consideration offered by the union, i.e., the benefits of union
membership."° Such interpretation rendered the employee's considera-
tion illusory.105 The employee incurred no legal detriment, but simply
promised to continue checkoff as long as she wanted to partake of the
consideration of union membership."0 6 The Sixth Circuit excoriated the
Eagle Signal Board for derogating a basic precept of contract law: a party
to a contract may not relieve herself from the obligation to perform
merely because she no longer desires the other party's performance; as
long as the other party remains ready to perform, both sides are
bound. 0 7 Consequently, where a member voluntarily resigned from the
union, and the union remained ready to tender the resignee the benefits
of union membership, contract law mandated that the resignee should be
bound to the authorization she signed even post-resignation. 10 8 The
existence of an implied or express condition that the authorization is in
consideration for the benefits of union membership should be irrelevant
to the survival of authorization where the member involuntarily relin-
quishes membership. 0 9 Only where membership is beyond the control
of the employee could the employee condition her performance on con-
tinuation of membership and still be bound contractually."
°
because he decides that he no longer wants the consideration for which he has
bargained. Therefore, the clear "legal import" of the authorization's language in
Campbell bound the employee to abstain from revoking the authorization.
Dalton, 827 F.2d at 548 (citations omitted).
103. Id. at 554; see also Postal Service, 833 F.2d at 1200.
104. Postal Service, 833 F.2d at 1199-1200.
105. An "illusory promise" as consideration occurs where two parties exchange
promises and one promise facially appears to impose absolutely no obligation whatsoever
on the promisor. The giver of illusory consideration merely promises "I will if I want to."
E. ALLEN FARNSWORTH, CoNrAcTS § 2.13, at 75 (2d ed. 1982). A promise, however, may
constitute valid consideration despite conditioning on the possible occurrence of a definite
event. Id.
106. Dalton, 827 F.2d at 554.
107. Postal Service, 833 F.2d at 1200 ("A party to a contract may not relieve himself of
the obligation to perform by indicating that he no longer desires the other party's perform-
ance. So long as the other party remains ready to perform, both sides are bound."). See
generally ARTHUR L. CORBIN, 3A CORBIN ON CorRAcrs § 654, at 136, § 656, at 144-45
(1951); RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CoNTwcrs § 75, Cmt. a (1981).
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The courts of appeals, while critical of the Eagle Signal doctrine, ne-
glected to offer a coherent alternative analysis for determining
waivability of the employee's right to revoke dues checkoff authorization.
In Lockheed, however, the Board expressly overruled the Eagle Signal
quid pro quo approach."' The Lockheed Board declared the Eagle Sig-
nal doctrine a misapplication of basic tenets of contract law.1 2 Although
in Lockheed the particular checkoff authorization at issue did not survive
resignation and the union's post-resignation enforcement of checkoff was
held to violate Section 8(b)(1)(A)," 3 the Board set forth a new test for
determining whether an employee, after membership resignation, may be
found to have agreed to continue paying dues pursuant to a previously
executed checkoff authorization." 4 The Lockheed test focused on the
dual statutory policies of "voluntary unionism," and clear and unmistaka-
ble waiver of statutory rights along with "relevant principles of contract
law" to determine the conditions for waiver of the right to revoke check-
off authorization." 5 The underlying rationale for the test indicates that
the significance of the Lockheed decision extends beyond the narrow
field of dues checkoff authorization and may be applied to surmise when,
if ever, other statutory rights may be abandoned voluntarily." 6 Compre-
hension of the far-reaching implications of Lockheed requires closer anal-
ysis of the opinion itself.
111. Lockheed, 302 N.L.R.B. 322, 324 (1991). The Board stated that "although we
reach the same result in this case, and although both the 'membership dues' language of
the authorization and principles of contract law are part of our analysis, we no longer
adhere to the 'quid pro quo' doctrine of Eagle Signal." Id.
112. Id. at 327. "Although we adhere to the characterization of a dues-checkoff author-
ization as a contract, reconsideration of this issue persuades us that the Eagle Signal analy-
sis did not adequately take into account pertinent principles of contract law." Id.
113. Id. at 330. The Board concluded:
By receiving, accepting, and retaining membership dues withheld from the pay
of David D. May after his resignation from membership in the Respondent and
by doing so solely on the authority of a checkoff authorization that did not clearly
and explicitly provide for a postresignation dues obligations, the Respondent
Union has restrained and coerced employees in their exercise of Section 7 rights
and violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act.
Id.
114. The Board explained that its new test is fashioned to promote the dual goals of
predictability and employee awareness of assumed obligations. Defending against putative
assertions that its test fails to yield a "bright line rule," the Board pointed out that numer-
ous legal standards promulgated by the Board exhibit similar ambiguity. Indeed, where
checkoff is concerned, such ambiguity permits influx of flexibility in determining which
considerations influence the outcome of a specific case. I& at 329.
115. Id. at 327.
116. See Hartley, supra note 12, at 25 ("In short, while these cases [including Lockheed)
seem to be about checkoff, and they are, they are much more about waiver.").
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C. Emergence of the Clear and Unmistakable Waiver Test
On January 8, 1988, a Lockheed union employee not employed under a
union security agreement resigned from the union and notified the union
of his request to terminate a previously executed checkoff authoriza-
tion.117 That checkoff authorization directed the employer to deduct
from his wages the "regular membership dues" he owed the union. 1 8 On
the date of the employee's resignation, the terms of the checkoff authori-
zation indicated that the requested revocation was untimely. 1 9 The
union refused to acknowledge the notification as effective and continued
to receive and retain the membership dues the company deducted from
the employee's wages. 2 On review of the situation, the General Coun-
sel of the Board 2' contended that the employee's resignation was effec-
tive when tendered and, pursuant to Eagle Signal, his resignation
terminated the authorization as a matter of law because the authorization
provided for the checkoff of "regular membership dues."'" The General
117. Lockheed, 302 N.L.R.B. at 322. The resignee mailed a note to the union which
included the following statement: "I, David Dwayne May, employee #TO7556, am request-
ing that I be dropped from your union membership. I have sent a notice to Lockheed
payroll, stopping my union dues." Id.
118. Id. at 322 n.2.
119. The union refused to accept the letter as a valid resignation on the grounds that
"the letter [was] ineffective to revoke May's dues obligation because it was sent during the
period when the authorization was irrevocable." Id. at 323 n.4.
The checkoff authorization stipulated that it was "irrevocable for a period of one year
from the date hereof or until the expiration of the present collective bargaining agreement
between the Company and the Union, whichever is the shorter of the two periods." Id. at
322.
The wording of this provision tracks the language of the proviso to Section 302(c)(4),
which limits the duration of dues checkoff authorization's irrevocable status to the lesser of
one year or the expiration of the collective bargaining agreement. 29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(4)
(1988). Nevertheless, it must be emphasized that the checkoff authorization need not au-
tomatically expire at the statutory expiration date. An authorization may provide for auto-
matic renewal if not revoked during a specified period of time prior to the expiration of the
contract or the year's end. C. Solari & Sons, Inc., 264 N.L.R.B. 282 (1982); see also
Monroe Lodge, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Litton Business Sys., 334
F. Supp. 310, 314-15 (W.D. Va. 1971), affd, 80 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2379 (4th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 409 U.S. 879 (1972). If the employee repeatedly fails to give effective notice during
the allotted window period, the checkoff authorization will continue indefinitely or until
the employee is no longer employed by the employer. See, e.g., NLRB v. Brotherhood of
Ry. Clerks, 498 F.2d 1105, 1109 (5th Cir. 1974) (finding employment severed and renewal
of authorization not automatic upon rehire).
120. Lockheed, 302 N.L.R.B. at 322-23.
121. The General Counsel of the NLRB is vested with the discretion to prosecute un-
ions and/or employers for perceived commissions of unfair labor practices. 29 U.S.C.
§ 153(d).
122. For this line of reasoning, the General Counsel stressed that the same result should
obtain in the instant case as in Eagle Signal because of the similarity between the language
of the dues checkoff provisions in Eagle Signal and in Lockheed. The authorization provi-
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Counsel further asserted that the union's retention of post-resignation
dues constituted an illegal restriction on an employee's right to resign
union membership."2 Such restriction, he insisted, "impairs the [Act's]
policy of voluntary unionism," as explicated by the Supreme Court in Pat-
tern Makers'.124 Arguing in the alternative, the General Counsel rea-
soned that even if membership resignation did not automatically revoke
checkoff authorization, resignation still effectively reduced the amount of
union dues the employee owed to nothing.12-
The Board concurred with the General Counsel that the Union vio-
lated Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Taft-Hartley Act by refusing to accept the
resignation and by continuing to retain checked-off membership dues.126
Nevertheless, the Board rejected the General Counsel's arguments and
relied on its own analysis of the implications of Board precedent, statu-
tory language, and policies. 27 The Board initiated its discussion of Board
precedent by framing the issue in terms of whether a union may seek
continuation of dues checkoff when a member resigns prior to the revoca-
tion period in cases where the underlying contract does not contain a
union security provision." The Board proceeded to discuss the case of
Shen-Mar Food Products,2 9 which similarly involved untimely revocation
of checkoff in a non-union security context. In Shen-Mar, the employer
argued that compelling continuation of checkoff of dues for employees
who had resigned union membership was equivalent to enforcing a
union-security device. The case arose in Virginia, a right-to-work state,
where union-security clauses are deemed illegal, as permitted by Section
14(b) of the Taft-Hartley Act. The employer reasoned that continued
checkoff of the resignee's dues conflicted with Section 14(b)'s allowance
sion in Eagle Signal allowed checkoff of "regular monthly dues"; the language of the dues
checkoff authorization in Lockheed provided for checkoff of "regular membership dues."
Lockheed, 302 N.L.R.B. at 323.
123. Id. (citing International Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, Local 1414
(Neufeld Porsche-Audi), 270 N.L.R.B. 1330 (1984)).
124. Id.
125. I. at 323 & n.5.
126. Id. at 330.
127. Id. at 323-27.
128. Id. at 323. The Board framed the issue:
This case presents the question whether a union, without reliance on any valid
union-security clause, may seek to require the continued checkoff of union
"membership dues" from the wages of an employee who signed a dues-checkoff
authorization that is irrevocable for 1 year or the expiration of the current collec-
tive-bargaining agreement, whichever is sooner, but who resigned from member-
ship before the end of that period of irrevocability.
Id.
129. Shen-Mar Food Prods., Inc., 221 N.L.R.B. 1329, 1329-34 (1976), enforced as modi-
fied, 557 F.2d 396 (4th Cir. 1977).
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of Virginia's prohibition of union-security clauses.' 30 The Board held
that dues checkoff authorizations were exclusively a matter of federal law
and, by virtue of federal preemption, not within the purview of Section
14(b). 13' Furthermore, the Board explained that such authorizations
could not properly be viewed as union security devices because they did
not "'impose union membership or support as a condition required for
continued employment."1
32
The Lockheed Board then examined the cases that provided the gene-
sis of Eagle Signal's quid pro quo approach: Campbell Industries, Frito-
Lay, and Eagle Signal.133 The Board emphasized the fact that wording
such as "membership dues," directly linking dues with membership, was
"critical" to the outcome of those cases.' 34 Note was taken that Shen-
Mar was neither discussed nor overruled, even sub-silentio, by the rea-
soning of those cases.' 35 The Board concluded that the language in the
signed checkoff authorization impacts whether resigning employees are
exonerated from restrictions on revocation.' 36 Furthermore, since Shen-
Mar remains good law, requiring a resignee to honor her commitment to
a dues checkoff authorization is not a per se illegal compulsion of union
membership. 37
The next portion of the Lockheed analysis examined the pertinent stat-
utory provisions and policies of the Taft-Hartley Act. The Board found
the language and legislative history of Section 302(c)(4) 138 ambiguous in
130. Id.
131. Id. at 1330.
132. Id.





138. Section 302(c)(4) permits an employer to deduct union membership dues from
employees' wages and remit those funds to their exclusive bargaining representative,
"[p]rovided, That the employer has received from each employee, on whose account such
deductions are made, a written assignment which shall not be irrevocable for a period of
more than one year, or beyond the termination date of the applicable collective agreement,
whichever occurs sooner." 29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(4) (1988).
The Lockheed Board found:
The problem is that the express language of the proviso of paragraph (4) does
not hinge the irrevocability of authorization on an employee's continued status as
a union member, but rather keys it exclusively to time-sensitive criteria-a period
of up to 1 year or the expiration of the collective-bargaining agreement, which-
ever occurred first.
Lockheed, 302 N.L.R.B. at 325 (emphasis added). Therefore, the proviso could be read as
"granting authority to unions and employers to enter into checkoff agreements that pro-
vide, once employee consent has been given, for limited periods of irrevocability without
regard to an employee's maintaining membership status." Id. Buried in a footnote, the
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terms of guidance regarding the effect of resignation on continuance of
the checkoff obligation.13 9 The main portion of Section 302(c)(4) lends
credence to the interpretation that dues checkoff is merely a payment
mechanism for discharging a preexisting dues obligation imposed by dint
of union membership."40 The language of Section 302(c)(4), however,
does not expressly condition checkoff duration on the employee's status
as a union member. Rather, checkoff duration is linked to a specific time
period, i.e., one year or the expiration date of the collective bargaining
agreement.1 41  By keying duration to time-sensitive criteria, Section
302(c)(4) ostensibly would permit dues checkoff authorization to survive
resignation.142 Amplification of the statute by resort to legislative history
failed to resolve the issue to the Board's satisfaction.143 Concluding that
"[a]t best, Congress seems to have simply stayed its hand from deciding
whether in all instances checkoff authorization must ultimately be a func-
tion of union membership," 1' " the Board resorted to the "more general
policies" of the Taft-Hartley Act 4 and relevant contract law princi-
ples146 to resolve the dilemma.
The Board refined the relationship between contract and checkoff by
categorizing checkoff agreements within the subset of contracts known as
assignments. 147 Specifically, a checkoff authorization constitutes a partial
Board acknowledged the possibility that "membership status might be an implicit limita-
tion on the proviso." Id. at 325 n.9. Reading such a limitation into the statute would be a
plausible application of the canons of statutory construction. See 2A C. SArNs, SutrmR.
LAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION §§ 47.08-.09 (4th ed. 1987). Nevertheless, the Board
discarded that interpretation on the ground that Congress could have explicitly placed a
membership limitation in the proviso to make checkoff dependant on union membership.
Lockheed, 302 N.L.R.B. at 325 n.9.
139. In other words, the Board found the language and legislative history of section
302(c)(4) equally supportive of the disparate conclusions that: (1) checkoff should termi-
nate simultaneously with resignation, as a matter of law; and (2) checkoff should survive
resignation and continue until revoked in accordance with the terms of the authorization
form. Lockheed, 302 N.L.R.B. at 323-25.
140. The Board gleaned this interpretation from the portion of the statute that reads




143. I. "The congressional deliberations offer meager assistance in determining which
portion of paragraph (4)-the main clause or the proviso-should prevail." Id.
144. Id at 327.
145. Id The Board cited "voluntary unionism" and the principle requiring "clear and
unmistakable" waiver of statutory rights as the policies relied upon in fashioning its new
test. Id
146. Id. at 327-28.
147. Id at 327. The Board stated:
Although we adhere to the characterization of a dues-checkoff authorization as a
contract, reconsideration of this issue persuades us that the Eagle Signal analysis
1993]
Catholic University Law Review
assignment of a future right. 148 The employee (assignor) assigns to the
union (assignee) a percentage of wages that the employee has a right to
receive from the employer (the obligor) in the future as long as he re-
mains employed.'49 The assignment may be conditional on union mem-
bership, in which case absence or disappearance of the condition may
destroy the assignee union's right to receive checked-off dues.
150
Whether the condition is extinguished, either through the union's expul-
sion of the member or the employee's resignation, depends on the lan-
guage of the checkoff agreement.515 Interpretation of the effect of the
language of the agreement on the existence of the condition requires an
understanding of the subtle interplay between the statutory policy requir-
ing "clear and unmistakable" waiver of rights guaranteed by Section 7 of
the Taft-Hartley Act and the wording of Section 302(c)(4) of the Taft-
Hartley Act. 52 Language stating that the dues checkoff authorization is
irrevocable will be construed as pertaining only to the method of pay-
ment conditional on the employee's membership, and thus be insufficient
to preserve a union's right to receive assigned dues following resignation
or expulsion of the employee.' 53 However, where additional language in
the authorization expressly acknowledges an obligation to pay dues even
in the absence of membership, the employee will be bound to her agree-
ment to continue checkoff post-resignation. 54
did not adequately take into account pertinent principles of contract law. A
checkoff authorization is that special form of contract defined in the Restatement




150. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) oF CoNTRA=S §§ 320, 331 (1981)).
151. The condition will automatically disappear and the dues authorization expire un-
less the employee explicitly waives the right to refrain from assisting the union.
152. Id. at 327 & n.18.
153. Id. at 328-29. The Board explained:
Accordingly, we will construe language relating to a checkoff authorization's
irrevocability-i.e., language specifying an irrevocable duration for either 1 year
from the date of the authorization's execution or on the expiration of the existing
collective-bargaining agreement-as pertaining only to the method by which dues
payments will be made so long as dues payments are properly owing. We shall not
read it as, by itself, a promise to pay dues beyond the term in which an employee
is liable for dues on some other basis.
Id. For an example of a case illustrating this approach to checkoff authorization's interpre-
tation, see Washington Gas Light Co., 302 N.L.R.B. 425 (1991) (holding that an employer
lawfully discontinued checkoff where checkoff authorization in the absence of additional
clear and unmistakable words manifesting contrary intent was construed to condition dues
obligation on union membership).
154. Lockheed, 302 N.L.R.B. at 329. The Board stated that "[e]xplicit language within
the checkoff authorization clearly setting forth an obligation to pay dues even in the ab-
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Applying its newly enunciated rubric to the facts of Lockheed, the
Board concluded that a union member such as the employee in Lockheed
who promised to pay "regular membership dues" by checkoff has not
obligated himself to continue paying dues after resignation (by checkoff
or otherwise). 5' Such language does not indicate that the employee
clearly assented to dues deduction even after submitting his "member-
ship" resignation.156 Although the "time specification" of the checkoff
authorization is clear, it is not clear whether someone who ceases to be a
union member has unmistakably assented to continue paying "regular
membership dues."' 57 In sum, the Board deemed the phrase "regular
membership dues" insufficient to constitute "clear and unmistakable"
waiver.' 58
D. Significance of the Clear and Unmistakable Waiver Test
The Board's opinion in Lockheed is significant because it identifies the
dual function of dues checkoff authorization as a method of payment and
a potential independent source of dues-paying obligation, where addi-
tional language in the authorization explicitly establishes an obligation to
furnish dues even in the absence of union membership. Lockheed's focus
on the language of the authorization superficially resembles the Eagle
Signal approach.'5 9 Lockheed, however, examined the authorization's
wording to assess whether the Section 7 right to refrain from assisting a
sence of union membership will be required to establish that the employee has bound
himself or herself to pay the dues even after resignation of membership." Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 330.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 329 & n.27. The Lockheed Board acknowledged this similarity:
Although our rule may often produce the same result with respect to authoriza-
tions referring to "membership dues" as would be the case under the Eagle Signal
doctrine, we are not simply applying that test under another label. As we read
the court precedent, the courts were critical of the Eagle Signal analysis mainly
because it rested on the unsupported assertion that the "language" and the "legal
import" of authorizations referring to payment of union membership dues "could
not be clearer," i.e., that such authorizations clearly constituted agreements in
which the benefits of union membership were the "quid pro quo" for the payment
of dues and were revoked by operation of law upon revocation. We now ac-
knowledge that the language is not clear as a matter of contract law. Indeed, as
explained above, that is the problem. Acknowledging the ambiguity, we now
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union monetarily had been expressly waived, rather than quibbling over
the nature of consideration. 16°
The Lockheed opinion establishes that the intersection of statutory pol-
icies and contract principles will determine when, if ever, the right not to
support a union financially may be waived.' 6 ' The point of intersection is
"clear and unmistakable" waiver. The Board stated that its new ap-
proach is designed to promote the twin goals of predictability and em-
ployee awareness of assumed obligations.' 62 Implicitly, the Board
endorsed "freedom of contract" as the criterion for determining
waivability of rights. 63
Lockheed's emphasis on voluntary unionism and contract principles
provides a rudimentary framework of analysis for determining the
waivability of other statutory rights.' 64 The Board focused on voluntary
unionism in the context of identifying the nature of the right arguably
infringed on by the continuation of dues checkoff subsequent to resigna-
160. 1d
161. See id. at 329.
162. Id.
163. A persistent question arises from the Board's endorsement of freedom of contract
in this context: what subtle relationship exists between freedom of contract for the em-
ployee with respect to the union and the concept of individual labor liberty as juxtaposed
against employer power?
One of [the] fundamental policies [of the NLRA] is freedom of contract. While
the parties' freedom ... is not absolute under the Act, allowing the Board to
compel agreement when the parties themselves are unable to agree would violate
the fundamental premise on which the Act is based-private bargaining under
governmental supervision of the procedure alone, without any official compulsion
over the actual terms of the contract.
H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99, 108 (1970) (footnote omitted).
Professor Pope has described the Supreme Court's nonprotectionist stance towards labor
protest as a labor "black hole" in the Constitution. The origins of the "black hole" are
traceable to the popular Lochner idea that "labor is a commodity and labor liberty consists
solely of an individual's right to sell her labor commodity." Pope, supra note 53, at 1073.
According to Pope, the modern trend is for courts to shy away from endorsing an "affirma-
tive vision of individual labor liberty." Id. at 1078. Market regulation and interest balanc-
ing are left to the legislative branch. Nevertheless, constitutional jurisprudence persists in
treating workers as commodity sellers. "In the name of avoiding one feature of Lochner-
ism-judicial enforcement of economic rights-the courts have embraced another-the
reduction of labor liberty to the status of an individual's right to sell labor power." Id. The
Lockheed decision injects an increasing measure of voluntarism into the relationship be-
tween the union and the member.
164. Robert Brousseau, Toward a Theory of Rights for the Employment Relation, 56
WASH. L. Rav. 1, 10 (1980). Without a principled means of determining which rights are
waivable and when "the meaning of rights within the employment relation becomes ob-
scure and the duties correlative equally so[,]" we run "the risk of cheapening whatever
social and economic values those rights assume, the values they should assure and pre-
serve." Id.
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tion.1 65 In contrast, the Board examined contract principles-waiver and
assignments-to determine the manner by which rights may be waived.
166
The Board's rationale in Lockheed implies that assessing the
waivability of a right entails a two-step process. One must: (1) identify
the nature/source167 of the right being waived and the statutory policy or
value being upheld by that right; and (2) invoke contract principles to
assure that the manner by which the right is waived is consistent with the
statutory policies and provisions implicated by waiver. Before analyzing
the bifurcated Lockheed rationale to assess waivability of Beck and resig-
nation rights, this Comment will first present examples drawn from Board
checkoff precedent to demonstrate what language constitutes clear and
unmistakable waiver.
E. Clear and Unmistakable Waiver Exemplified
The Board first found that dues checkoff authorization survived resig-
nation under Lockheed's "clear and unmistakable" waiver approach in
United Steelworkers Local 4671 (National Oil Well, Inc. ).168 In National
Oil Well, the union member executed a typical checkoff authorization
covering "monthly dues, assessments and.., an initiation fee." 16 9 The
authorization restricted its revocability, as permitted by Section 302(c)(4)
of the Taft-Hartley Act.17 Were such limitations the extent of the irrevo-
cability language, the authorization would not have survived the mem-
165. Lockheed, 302 N.L.R.B. at 327.
166. Id.
167. Brousseau utilized a similar approach in his endeavor to determine which statu-
tory rights may be waived by the union on the individual's behalf. Brousseau concluded
that the distinction between the nonwaivability of the "modest" right to handbill at the
workplace, NLRB v. Magnavox Co., 415 U.S. 322 (1974), and the waivability of the "ele-
mental" right to strike, Mastro Plastics Corp., 350 U.S. 270 (1956), ensues from the dispa-
rate nature of the rights at issue. Brousseau, supra note 164, at 5, 12. According to
Brousseau, "collective rights" are those rights necessary to restoring economic equilibrium
with the employer. The union may waive collective rights because those rights are vested
by labor statutes in the collective as a unit. Id. at 5. "Participatory rights" are the demo-
cratic rights of participation in the formation, administration and dissolution of the collec-
tive assured by Section 7 of the NLRA. By definition, participatory rights inhere in the
individual. As participatory rights are one of the counterbalances to a system of majority
rule, they may only be waived by the individual. Id.
168. 302 N.L.R.B. 367, 368 (1991). "Applying the analysis of Lockheed to the facts in
this case, we find that the Respondent has shown that the dues-checkoff authorization
signed by the [employee] obligated him to pay dues after his effective resignation from
membership in Local 4671." Id
169. Id. at 367 n.2.
170. Id. The authorization provided: "This assignment and authorization shall be effec-
tive and cannot be canceled for a period of one (1) year from such date appearing above or
until the termination date of the current collective bargaining agreement between the
Company and the Union, whichever occurs sooner." Id.
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ber's resignation.' 7 ' The authorization would have been deemed a partial
assignment of wages conditioned on union membership." 2
The checkoff authorization, however, further provided for the continu-
ation of checkoff "irrespective of my membership status in the union."
'13
The Board determined that the presence of this clause resulted in the
resignee's clear and unmistakable waiver of his right not to support the
union after resignation.174 The Board concluded that the resignee
"clearly authorized the continuation of his dues deduction even in the
absence of union membership." '75 Consequently, the continued enforce-
ment by the employer and the union of the checkoff authorization subse-
quent to resignation was not considered an unfair labor practice." 6 Since
the parties in National Oil Well had not negotiated a union security
clause, the checkoff authorization constituted an independent source of
the post-resignation dues obligation.
1 77
Similarly, in American Telegraph & Telephone Co.,17 the Board exon-
erated the employer for deducting, and the union for receiving and re-
taining, membership dues from the wages of an employee pursuant to
checkoff authorization after she had effectively resigned union member-
ship. 179 The checkoff authorization signed by the resignee prior to resig-
nation provided: "This authorization is voluntarily made and is neither
conditioned on my present or future membership in the Union, nor is it
to be considered as the quid pro quo for membership.' 80 The Board
deemed such language sufficiently explicit to establish an obligation to
pay dues even in the absence of union membership.' 8
171. See Lockheed, 302 N.L.R.B. 322, 328 (1991).
172. See id.
173. National Oil Well, 302 N.L.R.B. at 367 n.2. This provision of the checkoff form
stated:
Pursuant to this authorization and assignment, please deduct from my pay each
month, while I am in employment with the collective bargaining unit in the Com-
pany, and irrespective of my membership status in the Union, monthly dues, as-
sessments and (if owing by me) an initiation fee each as designated by the
International Treasurer of the Union.
Id. (emphasis added).
174. Id. at 368.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 368 n.9. "In Lockheed, the Board left open the question of how its waiver
rule would apply in the context of a lawful union-security provision. In the absence of a
union-security clause requiring union membership here, the Lockheed test is applicable to
this case." Id.
178. 303 N.L.R.B. 944 (1991).
179. Id. at 945.
180. Id. at 944 n.3.
181. Id. at 945. The Board stated:
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II. WArVER OF BECK RiG-rrs
The Board's decisions left unresolved the extent of the dues obligation
arising from clear and unmistakable waiver of the right to revoke dues
checkoff authorization. Under these decisions, is the union resignee obli-
gated to pay full dues or may she become a dues objector and obtain a
rebate of dues not germane to the negotiation and administration of the
collective bargaining agreement? Answering this question requires an
understanding of the Supreme Court's decision in Communication Work-
ers v. Beck and the distinction between union security and checkoff au-
thorization as sources of dues-paying obligations. 18
A. Union Security
The right to become a dues objector emanates from the compulsion to
pay dues imposed by a union security agreement as permitted under Sec-
tion 8(a)(3) of the Taft-Hartley Act. In Lockheed and National Oil Well,
the parties had not negotiated union security agreements. 18 3 When, as in
National Oil Well, a post-resignation dues obligation. arose, no corre-
sponding Beck right arose; the sole source of obligation was the checkoff
authorization." 4 Lockheed and National Oil Well therefore left open the
question of the effect of the Board's reasoning in these cases on the
waivability of Beck rights. 85
In Lockheed, the Board left open the question of how its waiver rule would apply
in the context of a lawful union-security provision. Notwithstanding the inclusion
of an agency-shop clause in the collective-bargaining agreement, we note that the
sole basis cited by the Respondent Union for continuing to extract membership
dues after an attempt to resign was the checkoff authorization itself.
Id. (citations omitted).
182. Recognizing that the Lockheed Board did not equate dues checkoff with union
security is crucial to this argument. The Board explained:
In reaching this conclusion we are not identifying forced union membership
with forced payment of dues. As noted above, we agree that the Board's decision
in Shen-Mar ... is still good law. We recognize that paying dues and remaining a
union member can be two distinct actions. We merely hold that the policy of
"voluntary unionism" that informs the Supreme Court's decision in Pattern Mak-
ers with regard to remaining, or declining to remain, a union member also logi-
cally relates to other forms of union activity.
Lockheed, 302 N.L.R.B. 322, 328 (1991); see also supra note 22.
183. Lockheed, 302 N.L.R.B. at 322 n.3; National Oil Well, 302 N.L.R.B. 367, 368 n.9
(1991).
184. National Oil Well, 302 N.L.R.B. at 368 ("Applying the analysis of Lockheed to the
facts in this case, we find that the Respondent has shown that the dues checkoff authoriza-
tion signed by the Charging Party obligated him to pay dues after his effective resignation
from membership in [the union].").
185. As indicated by clear and unmistakable waiver.
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B. Financial Core Employee Rights
The right to become a financial core employee arises when a collective
bargaining agreement contains a union security provision. When a collec-
tive bargaining agreement contains a union security clause and an em-
ployee under the agreement executes a dues checkoff authorization of
the type held to survive resignation, the right to become a financial core
employee becomes thornier. Lockheed left unsettled how its waiver test
would operate when a collective bargaining agreement includes a valid
union security provision.'86 Where a union security clause is in effect, it
is uncertain whether the checkoff authorization still functions as an as-
signment of wages independent of the union security clause, or whether it
reverts to its dependent status as the mere perfunctory dictator of the
method of payment of financial obligations imposed by the union security
clause. The Board's opinion in Penn Cork & Closures, Inc."8 7 implies
that it is possible for checkoff authorization to operate independently
from a union security clause.' 88 Not surprisingly, the circumstance under
which checkoff functions separately from union-security echoes the un-
derlying rationale of Lockheed's clear and unmistakable waiver test:
knowing assumption of an obligation.'
8 9
In Penn Cork, the employees signed checkoff authorizations while a
union security agreement was in effect.190 Subsequently, the employees
voted to deauthorize the union,191 rescinding the union's authority to act
as their official bargaining representative. Once the deauthorization was
certified by the Regional Director of the Board, immediate suspension of
the union-shop provision went into effect.'" Employees, liberated from
the strictures of union security, availed themselves of the opportunity to
186. National Oil Well, 302 N.L.R.B. at 368 n.9; see also supra note 177.
187. 156 N.L.R.B. 411 (1965), enforced, 376 F.2d 52 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 843
(1967).
188. Id. at 414.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 413.
191. Id. The Board stated:
Section 9(e)(1) of the Act provides for such petition, as follows: Upon filing
with the Board, by 30 percent or more of the employees in a bargaining unit
covered by an agreement between their employer and a labor organization made
pursuant to Section 8(a)(3), of a petition alleging they desire that such authority
be rescinded, the Board shall take a secret ballot of the employees in such a unit
and certify the results thereof to such labor organization and to the employer.
Id. at 413 n.9.
192. Id. at 414 (citing Monsanto Chem. Co., 147 N.L.R.B. 49 (1964)).
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resign from membership.19 The issue for the Penn Cork Board's resolu-
tion was whether those resignees could then revoke their previously exe-
cuted checkoff authorizations, even though such revocation would be
untimely according to the provisions of their authorizations.194
The Board held that the authorizations could be revoked because,
when executed, the employees were aware of the existence of a union-
security clause and could not reasonably have foreseen the likelihood
that a deauthorization would occur, union security terminate, and yet a
dues obligation continue.19 The nuances of the Board's wording, "on the
facts before us we cannot agree that the exercise of this option by em-
ployees is in all circumstances independent of the impact of union secur-
ity,"196 implies that in some cases, checkoff could be independent. The
corollary of the Board's inference that the Penn Cork employees would
not have expected authorization to continue post-resignation is that,
where employees are alerted to the potential for continued checkoff post-
resignation, checkoff could thus survive the extinguishment of union se-
curity. It is the initial employee awareness of incurrence of a future obli-
gation via checkoff at a time when a concomitant union security provision
is in effect that imbues checkoff authorization with the authority to ex-
tend the obligation after termination of union security. Therefore, when
employees are "clearly and unmistakably" aware of the ramifications of
voluntary assumption"9 of a checkoff obligation from the outset, the
checkoff authorization is independent of union security. As a result,
checkoff may still function as an independent assignment of wages in the
union security context.
The conclusion that checkoff authorization may function as a distinct
source of dues-paying obligation even in the union security context
193. Id. "Many employees took the opportunity to resign from membership, as they
were entitled to do under Section 7 of the Act, thus exercising their statutory right as
individuals to refrain from union activity in the absence of a union-shop provision." Id.
194. Id. at 413-14.
195. Id. at 414. The Board observed:
Here the Respondent [employer] and the Union had agreed to a contract contain-
ing both union-security and checkoff provisions. The contract not only required
the employees to be union members but offered them the convenience of paying
membership dues effortlessly through wage deductions which the Employer
agreed to make. When executing these checkoff authorizations, the employees
can hardly have been unmindful of the fact that they had to pay union dues.
Id.
196. Id.
197. Lockheed, 302 N.L.R.B. 322,328 (1991). In Penn Cork, the Union contended that
"the right to discontinue union membership is not the right to revoke outstanding checkoff
authorization inasmuch as signing a checkoff authorization is optional with employees and
not dependent upon the existence of union security." Penn Cork, 156 N.L.R.B. at 414.
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means that the Lockheed rationale may be applied to assess waiver of
dues-paying obligations where union security is in effect. If the employee
may, via checkoff, waive the statutory right not to pay any dues to the
union when no union security agreement exists, may the employee labor-
ing under a union security contract also waive her right not to pay the
portion of dues directly related to contract negotiation? The answer to
the proposed question depends on when, if ever, the right to become a
dues objector may be relinquished by clear and unmistakable waiver.
198
Since the waivability of the right to become a financial core employee
(Beck rights) is a function of the nature of the right and the manner in
which it is waived, 99 the nature of Beck rights and the viability of dues
authorization as a method of waiver must be explored.
1. The Nature of Beck Rights
Beck rights originated from a clash between the values of free speech
and association embedded in the Constitution and federal labor stat-
utes2° and the societal commitment to a powerful and independent trade
union movement. 201 Some employees complained that mandatory pay-
ment of dues was tantamount to coerced support of political and ideologi-
cal movements antithetical to their own beliefs and thus an abridgement
of their First Amendment rights to free speech and association.20 2 In
198. See Hartley, supra note 12, at 24. Professor Hartley stated, "I suspect the answer
to this question will turn on when, if at all, may the right to become a dues objector,
guaranteed by Communications Workers v. Beck, be lost by clear and unequivocal
waiver?" Id.
199. See supra notes 111-67 and accompanying text.
200. See Summers, supra note 61, at 697. "National labor policy, as articulated by Con-
gress, was rooted in the first amendment right of freedom of association." Id.; see also
Friesen, supra note 2, at 619 ("The first amendment-based inquiry into actual ideological
affront has been abandoned. The net result is that first amendment concerns have pro-
pelled the Court beyond what the Constitution requires."); James G. Pope, The Three-
Systems Ladder of First Amendment Values: 7vo Rungs and a Black Hole, 11 HASnNos
CONsT. L.Q. 189, 191 (1984) ("On the ladder of First Amendment values, political speech
occupies the top rung, commercial speech rests on the rung below, and labor speech is
relegated to a 'black hole' beneath the ladder.").
201. Since passage of the Wagner Act in 1935, the encouragement of labor collectiviza-
tion has been an express national policy:
It is declared to be the policy of the United States to eliminate the causes of
certain substantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce ... by encouraging
the practice and procedure of collective bargaining and by protecting the exercise
by workers of full freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of
representatives of their own choosing, for the purpose of negotiating the terms
and conditions of their employment or other mutual aid or protection.
29 U.S.C. § 151 (1988) (emphasis added).
202. See supra note 32. Opponents of union security agreements also argued that un-
ions should survive or falter on their own merits, like businesses; that union security agree-
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Railway Employees Department v. Hanson,"3 the United States Supreme
Court declared that union security provisions do not violate protesting
employees' freedom of speech and association rights or their Fifth
Amendment right to "liberty" of employment.' Any infringement of
First Amendment rights was overcome by the government's compelling
interest in promoting collective bargaining and its exalted goal-indus-
trial peace. 20 5 The Court expressly reserved the question whether impo-
sition of dues "as a cover for forcing ideological conformity or other
action" could abridge employees' First Amendment rights.' 6 In Interna-
tional Ass'n of Machinists v. Street,2'7 the Court faced this question in the
context of a constitutional challenge to union political expenditures
where an agency shop agreement had been negotiated pursuant to Sec-
tion 2 Eleventh of the Railway Labor Act (RLA).208 The Court avoided
rendering a decision on constitutional grounds, interpreting Section 2
Eleventh of the RLA to permit exaction of dues from dissenting employ-
ees for collective bargaining purposes, but not for political or other pur-
poses. 20 9  Ellis v. Brotherhood of Railway, Airline and Steamship
Clerks21 refined the Court's Street opinion, interpreting Section 2 Elev-
enth to allow the compulsion of dues only for expenses "necessarily or
reasonably" related to the union's discharge of its collective bargaining
duties under the Act.211
In Abood v. Detroit Board of Education,2 12 the Supreme Court con-
fronted the constitutional issue it had expressly avoided in Hanson and
ments "detract from responsible unionism, give unions too great a voice in hiring decisions,
and employees' rights to work wherever they wish." DEP'T OF LABOR BuL.. No. 1425-21,
supra note 7, at 4. Clarence Darrow pithily characterized the right to work argument as "a
bit of birdlime, used to catch the unthinking mass." The Open Shop, reprinted in CIO, The
Case Against 'Right to Work' Laws 78 (undated).
203. 351 U.S. 225 (1956).
204. Id. at 238. The Court stated that "the requirement for financial support of the
collective-bargaining agency by all who receive the benefits of its work is within the power
of Congress under the Commerce Clause and does not violate either the First or Fifth
Amendments." Id.
205. Id. at 235; see also Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 222 (1977) (find-
ing that any putative infringement on First Amendment rights of employees "is constitu-
tionally justified by the legislative assessment of the important contribution of the union
shop to the system of labor relations established by Congress"). Moreover, trade unions
were found to support the liberty to work, rather than denigrate it. Railway Employees,
351 U.S. at 235.
206. Railway Employees, 351 U.S. at 238.
207. 367 U.S. 740 (1961).
208. Id. at 743-44.
209. Id. at 749-50.
210. 466 U.S. 435 (1984).
211. Id. at 448.
212. 431 U.S. 209 (1977).
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Street. In Abood the Court held that agency shop agreements infringe
upon a dissenter's First Amendment rights.21 The majority deemed such
infringement tolerable where compelled dues are expended on collective
bargaining activities because of the state's interest in promoting the prac-
tice and procedure of collective bargaining.214 Political activities, how-
ever, were found to constitute an impermissible invasion of a dissenter's
First Amendment rights."' 5
In Communication Workers v. Beck,21 6 the Supreme Court first ad-
dressed whether Section 8(a)(3) of the NLRA permitted a union and em-
ployer to negotiate and enforce an agency shop agreement, and, if so,
whether such agreements abrogated the First Amendment rights of dis-
senting employees.217 The Court found that Congress's sole purpose in
allowing union security agreements pursuant to Section 8(a)(3) was to
ensure that workers who shared the benefits of collective bargaining con-
comitantly shared the costs of such bargaining.1 8 Consonant with its in-
terpretation of congressional intent, the Court concluded that the union
may only compel dissenting employees (dues objectors) to fund those ac-
tivities directly related to collective bargaining.219
213. In Abood, the Supreme Court did not require that the government interest be
"compelling," a relaxation of standards that incurred Justice Powell's criticism: "Before
today it had been well established that when state law intrudes upon protected speech, the
State itself must shoulder the burden of proving that its action is justified by overriding
state interests. The Court, for the first time in a First Amendment case, simply reverses
this principle." Id. at 263 (Powell, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
214. Id. at 225-26.
215. Id. at 235-36.
216. 487 U.S. 735 (1988).
217. Id. at 738. The Court stated:
Today we must decide whether this provision [Section 8(a)(3)] also permits a
union, over the objections of dues-paying nonmember employees, to expend
funds so collected on activities unrelated to collective bargaining, contract admin-
istration, or grievance adjustment, and, if so, whether such expenditures violate
the union's duty of fair representation or the objecting employees' First Amend-
ment rights.
Id.
218. Id. at 749-50. The Court noted that "'Congress' decision to allow union-security
agreements at all reflects its concern that ... the parties to a collective bargaining agree-
ment be allowed to provide that there be no employees who are getting the benefits of
union representation without paying for them."' Id. at 750 (alteration and emphasis in
original) (quoting Oil Workers v. Mobil Oil Corp., 426 U.S. 407, 416 (1976)).
219. Id. at 745. "The statutory question presented in this case, then, is whether this
'financial core' includes the obligation to support union activities beyond those germane to
collective bargaining, contract administration, and grievance adjustment. We think it does
not." Id. The Court further stated:
We conclude that § 8(a)(3), like its statutory equivalent, § 2, Eleventh of the
RLA, authorizes the exaction of only those fees and dues necessary to "perform-
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Although the opinion was couched in terms of statutory interpreta-
tion, 2° constitutional values strongly influenced the outcome in Beck. 21
The decision actually rests upon the theory that use of compelled dues to
promote causes contrary to the dues payor's beliefs offends notions of
free speech and association. 2 The Court essentially equated forced sub-
sidization of union expression with government-compelled affirmation of
belief, which constitutes a classic First Amendment violation?'
Having isolated the importance of First Amendment, free association
values to the nature of Beck rights, further refining whether the Beck
decision explicitly relied on the First Amendment in its decision becomes
superfluous.224 The Taft-Hartley Act, like other labor statutes, incorpo-
ing the duties of an exclusive representative of the employees in dealing with the
employer on labor-management issues."
I& at 762 (quoting Ellis v. Brotherhood of R.R., Airline & S.S. Clerks, 466 U.S. 435, 448
(1984)).
220. The opinion has been heavily criticized by commentators for its reliance on Sec-
tion 2, Eleventh of the RLA and the legislative history of the RLA, which was drafted four
years after the NLRA. See, e.g., Dau-Schmidt, supra note 37, at 53-54, 72-73 (arguing that
the Court failed to analyze the words, administrative interpretations, and legislative history
of the Taft-Hartley Act which would not limit exaction of dues simply to collective bargain-
ing purposes).
221. Hartley, supra note 30, at 82-85. Professor Hartley maintains that "constitutional
values, and not the label 'germane to collective bargaining,' determine which union activi-
ties are chargeable to objectors in both the public sector and the RLA dues objector
cases." Id. at 82.
222. See Friesen, supra note 2, at 608.
223. This equation has come under heavy critical fire. See, e.g., Cloke, supra note 32,
at 582 ("Requiring an individual to contribute to a union which spends a portion of the
contribution on political causes does not constitute a compulsion to believe in, express
support for, or espouse ideas the money finances."); Shiffrin, supra note 32, at 590-91 (stat-
ing that "compulsory support of union political activities does not compel [objectors] to
believe anything or to express anything, nor does it prohibit them from believing or expres-
sing anything"); see also Harry H. Wellington, The Constitution, The Labor Union, and
"Governmental Action," 70 YALE LJ. 345 (1961). For an insightful look into the relation-
ship between expenditure of dues and the capacity to engage in expressive activity, see
Norman L. Cantor, Forced Payments to Service Institutions and Constitutional Interests in
Ideological Non-Association, 36 RuTrouRs L. Rnv. 3, 27-28 (1983).
224. Much has been written concerning the interrelationship between the state action
doctrine and the Supreme Court decisions concerning dues rebate for public sector em-
ployees, those employees covered by the RLA, and those employees affected by the Taft-
Hartley Act. See, e.g., Dau-Schmidt, supra note 37; RJ. Staaf & E.G. West, Paying for
Compulsory Union Services: The Entanglement Consequences of Agency Shops in the Pub-
lic Sector, 17 WAKE FoREsT L. Rnv. 359, 361 (1981) (using economic and public choice
analysis to examine the public/private issue). Recall that invoking the First Amendment
and most other constitutional protections requires state action. Lloyd Corp., Ltd. v. Tan-
ner, 407 U.S. 551, 567 (1972). A thesis of this Comment, however, is that the state action
question can be avoided entirely because Congress, in drafting the Taft-Hartley Act, in-
jected First Amendment values into the provisions of the Act. See Summers, supra note
61, at 687. In a much earlier article that concentrated on appropriate legal means for mod-
erating unions' power, Professor Wellington described how "[r]anging wide through society
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rates constitutional values into the provisions of the Act.225 Beck rights
were created to protect employees' right to freedom of association,2
6
which is not a per se unwaivable right. 27 Accordingly, the assessment of
and deep into the Constitution, commentators have suggested that all or most 'powerful'
private groups should be subject to all or most provisions of the Constitution." Wellington,
supra note 223, at 346 (citing Arthur S. Miller, The Constitutional Law of the "Security
State," 10 STAN. L. REV. 620, 655-56 (1958)). Professor Wellington acknowledged that the
Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment are "great instruments" for protecting peo-
ple from government tyranny and unions have characteristics in common with the govern-
ment. Id. at 348. Wellington grudgingly recognized the "aesthetic and emotional appeal"
of the view that because unions are similar to government and the Constitution protects
the individual from government encroachment, the Constitution should be invoked to pro-
tect individuals from unions. Id. Conceding that regulation of unions is desirable, he
nonetheless cautioned that "it need not be assumed a priori that the Constitution is the
proper regulatory instrument. Other, more appropriate, means may be available to accom-
plish the same desirable ends." I. TWenty-five years later, Professor Summers pointed
out that Congress had already provided those means by incorporating constitutional values
into the labor statute. Summers, supra note 61, at 697. Professor Summers argued elo-
quently for the proposition that where the Supreme Court is prohibited from resorting to
constitutional safeguards if a controversy lacks state action, the legislature is responsible
for providing requisite protection equivalent to constitutional rights. I&a at 695. In his
estimation, "constitutional values are not cabined in the confines of state action and the
limited competence of the Court to mandate constitutional rights. Other institutions of
government have equal, indeed greater, responsibility for protecting and promoting consti-
tutional values, and every legal process should be permeated and informed by those val-
ues." Id. Noting the blurred distinction between state and private action, Summers
declares that "[w]hen we privatize control over people's lives we must protect constitu-
tional values against private control. We must privatize personal freedom." Id. at 691.
225. Summers, supra note 61, at 696-702. Professor Summers examined Congress's in-
corporation of the right of freedom of association into the Norris-La Guardia Act of 1932,
the Wagner Act of 1935, and the Landrum-Griffin Act of 1959, commenting that
"[n]ational labor policy, as articulated by Congress, was rooted in the first amendment
right of freedom of association." Id at 697.
226. See discussion supra notes 86-252 and accompanying text.
227. The enduring enigma of unionization is that it endeavors to protect the interests of
the individual worker through means of collectivization. Legislators, cognizant of the dan-
ger of substituting the tyranny of the employer for that of the majority union, crafted labor
statutes concomitantly to promote the power of the collective while protecting the auton-
omy of the individual employee. Accordingly, rights that have been found to constitute
collective rights cannot be individually waived because they inhere in the collective and not
the individual. One example of such right is discriminatory discharge pursuant to Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The employee's case may be taken to arbitration regard-
less of whether the employee wants to press the issue because of the importance to all
other employees that the work environment be devoid of discrimination. By contrast,
other rights deemed to inhere in the individual cannot be waived by the collective union.
NLRB v. Magnavox Co., 415 U.S. 322 (1974) (finding that Section 7 rights, unlike eco-
nomic rights, cannot be waived by the collective bargaining agent of the employees). Since
the right of freedom of association evolved to protect the individual from the forces of
government (via the First Amendment) or government-like institutions (via Sections 7 and
8(a)(3) of the Taft-Hartley Act), the right "belongs" to the individual. Therefore, it may be
individually waived.
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waivability of Beck rights demands sensitivity to the manner of waiver,
ensuring that employees' freedom of association is not violated.'
2. Manner of Waiver of Beck Rights
While Beck rights exist to uphold the value of free association that may
be compromised by the forced compulsion of dues, Beck rights can be
waived so long as waiver does not violate the right to free association.
The distinguishing feature of checkoff authorization as a source of dues
paying obligation, in contrast to union security, is that each checkoff au-
thorization must be individually executed.229 Therefore, even though the
employer and the union may agree to a dues checkoff clause in a collec-
tive bargaining agreement, each employee is to decide whether or not to
execute a checkoff authorization. An employee may be required to pay
dues under union security but decline to agree to dues checkoff authori-
zation and/or decline to agree to waiver of the revocability of the authori-
zation. In this manner, dues checkoff authorization and the waiver of its
revocability injects an element of voluntarism into the union security
arrangement.
If compelling an employee to pay money to support ideological causes
is deemed improper because it would be the equivalent of coercing ideo-
logical beliefs, then if the employee voluntarily and knowingly agrees to
pay money to support certain causes she objects to, it cannot be argued
that the payment constitutes coercion any particular belief3 ° Beck
228. This Comment proposes the use of individual contracts as the means of waiver.
However, questions arise as to the distinction between this scenario and that of "yellow
dog" contracts which flourished during the last century. Yellow dog contracts were con-
tracts, individually executed by the employee, promising not to join a union as a condition
of obtaining and maintaining employment. BAR-rosic & HARTLEY, supra note 7, at 9-11.
Congress expressly prohibited yellow dog contracts in Section 3 of the Norris-LaGuardia
Act of 1932. 29 U.S.C. § 103 (1988). Proposed waivers of Beck rights differ from yellow
dog contracts because such waivers are not prerequisite to obtaining and maintaining em-
ployment. As voluntary executions, agreements to waive Beck rights are expressions of
the right of free association. Moreover, since waivers would permit the union to expend
dues on political and other activities, such agreements improve the union's ability to per-
form its function as an employee representative. Ultimately the congressional policy of
promoting collective bargaining would be enhanced.
229. 28 U.S.C. § 186(c)(4) (1982).
230. Recent Supreme Court decisions excluding voluntary members from the class of
employees who may become dues objectors support the emphasis on voluntariness as the
crucial element enabling waiver of Beck rights. See Chicago Teachers Union, Local No. 1
v. Hudson, 475 U.S. 292 (1986) (stating that it is the nonunion employee whose First
Amendment rights are affected by political spending, although no full union members
joined the suit). Judge Murnaghan of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit, who cast the deciding vote to find union liability in Beck v. Communications
Workers, 800 F.2d 1280 (4th Cir. 1986), affd, 487 U.S. 735 (1988), carefully limited his
rationale to the nonunion, involuntary fee payor. Id. at 1287 & n.10. Justice Brennan's
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rights were created to counteract the element of coercion in union secur-
ity.23 Since under a dual union security and dues checkoff arrangement
dues checkoff is voluntary, the act of voluntarily agreeing to pay money
pursuant to dues checkoff should negate the element of coercion that
Beck rights guard against.232 Therefore, if an employee were clearly and
unmistakably to waive her right to revoke a dues checkoff authorization
of the National Oil Well form, i.e., the type of authorization which the
Board has found gives rise to a continuing dues obligation post-resigna-
tion,21 3 that waiver could also function as a waiver of his Beck rights.
3. Comment: Notice of Special Considerations
Having determined that Beck rights may be waived, it is necessary to
incorporate the fairness and contract concerns implied by Lockheed's
clear and unmistakable waiver test. Most prominent among the addi-
tional conditions for waiver of Beck rights are provision of notice and
consideration.
a. Notice
When an employee is bound by a union security agreement and af-
forded the option of waiving the post-resignation right to revoke checkoff
authorization, notice is a threshold impediment to finding the checkoff
authorization a voluntarily assumed partial wage assignment. Pursuant to
Lockheed's rational, dues checkoff authorization may operate both as an
opinion, affirming the Fourth Circuit, described the beneficiaries of Beck rights as "dues
paying nonmember employees." Communications Workers v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735, 738
(1988); see also Kidwell v. Transportation Communications Int'l Union, 731 F. Supp. 192
(D. Md. 1990), affd in part and rev'd in part, 946 F.2d 283 (4th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112
S. Ct. 1760 (1992).
Scholars also tend to support the view that regular, voluntary union members are pro-
hibited from asserting Beck rights. See LAWRENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONsTrrTUnONAL
LAW § 12-4, at 805 n.5 (2d ed. 1988) ("Presumably, membership being voluntary, members
were deemed to have consented to the expenditure."); Friesen, supra note 2, at 620 n.57
("As a common sense matter, a full member's rights against the union might be governed
only by contract law, in addition to whatever union rules the membership has approved.
Thus, the fee speech rules are commonly assumed to apply only in favor of nonmembers or
'financial core' members.").
231. See discussion supra notes 26-38 and accompanying text.
232. See Sales, Serv., & Allied Workers' Union, Local No. 80 (Capitol-Husting Co.),
235 N.L.R.B. 1264 (1978). The contract involved in Capitol-Husting contained both a
union security clause and a checkoff provision allowing checkoff of membership dues and
nonmember service fees (i.e., financial core employee dues). An employee resigned from
the union and attempted to effectuate revocation of his checkoff authorization outside the
permissible escape periods. The Board held that revocation was ineffective but the union
was only entitled to receive checkoff of nonmember service fees. Id. at 1264-65.
233. For a discussion of the National Oil Well case, see supra notes 161-70 and accom-
panying text. To access the language of the agreement form verbatim, see supra note 166.
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independent source of payment obligation and as a method of pay-
ment. 34 Absent clear and unmistakable language to the contrary, the
authorization will be construed as merely a method of payment and not a
source of dues obligation. 35 Accordingly, the employee executing a
waiver of the right to revoke dues checkoff authorization would reason-
ably infer that she had only agreed to a checkoff of those dues required
by union security.3 6 Since Beck rights ordinarily arise under union se-
curity, the employee would not be alert to the possibility that she has
clearly and unmistakably waived her Beck rights. Fairness demands that
the employee be apprised of the ramifications of her signature.
By analogy to the Board's remedy in unfair labor practice determina-
tions, the mere posting of a notice in a conspicuous location in the work-
place where all the employees would be likely to observe it, such as on
the employee and/or member bulletin boards, might be sufficient.3 7
However, it seems that something more should be required to constitute
proper notice where the issue is notification of a right for the purpose of
clear and unmistakable waiver as opposed to notification of the bare
existence of the right."3 Proper notice under the circumstances could
entail conspicuous language on the authorization form itself (in English
and other pertinent languages) explaining the significance of the waiver
language.3 9 Since the waiver issue is complex, it might also be advisable
234. See supra notes 19-43 and accompanying text.
235. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
236. The Second Circuit's opinion in Penn Cork supports the normalcy of inferring that
waiver of the post-resignation right to revoke checkoff when under a union security agree-
ment limits the partial assignment of wages via checkoff to that imposed by the union
security agreement alone. Penn Cork & Closures, Inc., 156 N.L.R.B. 411, 412 (1965), en-
forced, 376 F.2d 52 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 843 (1967).
237. See Lockheed, 302 N.L.R.B. 322, 331 (1991); see also AimCAN LABOR POLicy:
A CRmcAL APPRAISAL OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS Acr 372-75 (Charles J.
Morris ed. 1985) (suggesting promulgations of special rules, including provision of clear
notice of rules pertaining to checkoff and strike resignations).
238. For example, in the criminal law context, spoken Miranda warnings are given to
apprise an arrestee of the existence of rights in order to assure that his subsequent waiver
of those rights is knowing and intelligent. See generally E. CLEARY, MCCORMICK ON EvI-
DENCE § 153 (3d ed. 1984).
239. U.C.C. § 1-201(10) (1992). The Uniform Commercial Code definitions state:
"Conspicuous": A term or clause is conspicuous when it is so written that a
reasonable person against whom it is to operate ought to have noticed it. A
printed heading in capitals (as: NON-NEGOTIABLE BILL OF LADING) is
conspicuous. Language in the body of a form is "conspicuous" if it is in larger or
other contrasting type or color.
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to have someone present at the signing of the authorization form who is
able to clarify any confusion orally.240
b. Consideration
The second issue is whether separate consideration is necessary for the
effective waiver of Beck rights where the employee is also under a union
security agreement. In the non-union security context, such as National
Oil Well, the consideration for an employee's promise to pay union dues
following resignation is the union's willingness to grant membership. The
promise of membership can constitute the consideration for the promise
to pay dues even after resignation because the union is not legally obli-
gated to provide membership in a non-union security context. 241
By contrast, where union security is in effect, the individual employee
already has a right to union membership.24 Because the union has a pre-
240. If that "someone," however, is a union member, problems of subtle or apparent
coercion might ensue. Would the employee feel pressured into signing the waiver by virtue
of the mere presence of a union member elucidating the language of the authorization?
Would courts find coercion? The danger of collective pressure has been noted by Brous-
seau, supra note 164, at 27 n.112. Brousseau states that "my theory does not admit lightly
of waiver by individuals. The pressures brought to bear upon the individual to waive his
rights are precisely the unequal pressures which the collective system seeks to redress." Id.
241. Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 323 U.S. 192, 204 (1944) (distinguishing
between a union's obligation as collective bargaining representative under the RLA and
that union's "right to determine eligibility to its membership"). Accord Kidwell v. Trans-
portation Communications, Int'l Union, 946 F.2d 283, 299 (4th Cir. 1991).
242. Communication Workers Local 1104 v. NLRB, 520 F.2d 411 (2d Cir. 1975), cerL
denied, 423 U.S. 1051 (1976). In construing the second proviso to Section 8(a)(3) of Taft-
Hartley, the court declared that "although a union... cannot compel any greater degree of
membership than financial core membership, it must nonetheless, even under an agency
shop clause, grant full membership to those who desire it if it wants to retain its right to
receive their dues." Id. at 418 n.8.
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existing duty24 by virtue of union security' to offer membership, the
promise of membership alone is insufficient to support the employee's
additional promise to pay full union dues following resignation.
The determination that in the union security context consideration
other than the promise of union membership is a prerequisite for enforce-
able waiver of the right to revoke dues checkoff authorization requires
identification of what constitutes valid additional consideration. Since
courts will not inquire into the adequacy of consideration, the considera-
tion need not match identically the value of the right the employee is
waiving.' 5 Nevertheless, "in consideration" of the nature of the Beck
243. An agreement to discharge an existing obligation and an agreement to modify an
existing contract may have implications for the adequacy of consideration because of the
"pre-existing duty rule." The pre-existing duty rule dictates that the performance or prom-
ise to perform a pre-existing duty is invalid consideration. See FAmSWORTH, supra note
107, § 4.21.
The modem trend away from the pre-existing duty rule is reflected in Section 89(a) of
the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, which provides: "A promise modifying a duty under
a contract not fully performed on either side is binding (a) if the modification is fair and
equitable in view of circumstances not anticipated by the parties when the contract was
made .... ." REsTATEmENT (SEcoND) OF CoTRrAcrs § 89(2) (1979). See generally Mor-
ton J. Horwitz, The Historical Foundations of Modern Contract Law, 87 HARv. L. Rv. 917
(1974) (tracing the history of modem contract law).
Section 89(a) of the Restatement only enforces a modification if the parties voluntarily
agree and if (1) the promise modifying the original contract was made before the contract
was fully performed on either side, (2) the underlying circumstances which prompted mod-
ification were unanticipated by the parties, and (3) the modification is fair and equitable.
RESATEmENT (SEcoND) OF CoNrmiRcrs § 89(a). Since the checkoff authorization
presents no unanticipated change in circumstances, waiver of its revocation probably could
not be considered an enforceable contract modification pursuant to the terms of the
Restatement.
244. The pre-existing duty rule also applies where the pre-existing duty is imposed by
law, instead of by contract. FARNSswOa-, supra note 105, § 4.21, at 272 (citing Grant v.
Green, 41 Iowa 88 (1875) (holding that a wife is under a duty to care for her insane hus-
band)). Where Beck rights are concerned, the pre-existing duty is a legal duty imposed by
the second proviso to Section 8(a)(3) of Taft-Hartley, as interpreted by Communication
Workers, 520 F.2d at 411.
245. See Haigh v. Brooks, 113 Eng. Rep. 119 (K.B. 1839) (following the traditional rule
indicating that it is not the court's function to concern itself with the adequacy or inade-
quacy of the legal detriment); see also In re American Coils Co., 187 F.2d 384 (3d Cir.
1951). See generally JOHN D. CAAMAMx & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, Tim LAW OF CoNTRncrs
§ 4-3, at 136 (2d ed. 1977) ("As a general rule it is settled that any detriment no matter how
economically inadequate will support a promise."); Robert Braucher, Freedom of Contract
and the Second Restatement, 78 YALE Li 598 (1969).
Economic inadequacy of the detriment (consideration) is still one of the factors that a
court will consider in assessing whether the consideration induced the bargain. CAImm.uIM
& PERmLO, supra § 4-3. Courts have generally, however, deemed relief of an adult party
from a bad bargain to constitute an unwarranted interference with freedom of contract.
Black Indus. v. Bush, 110 F. Supp. 801, 805 (D.N.J. 1953). The court in Black Industries
stated:
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rights the employee is waiving, it is tempting to suggest that the union
offer something related to a free association right. For example, unions
are not required by law to permit non-members to attend meetings.24
The union could promise to allow non-member employees who have
waived their Beck rights via checkoff authorization to attend meetings
and voice their opinions regarding how their dues are being spent. In a
similar First Amendment vein, the union could offer waivees a free sub-
scription to the union's periodical for the duration of the waiver period.
Neither the invitation to attend meetings nor regular receipt of the
union's journal, however, may prove sufficient to dissuade members from
relinquishing the opportunity to receive a dues rebate. The most persua-
sive consideration the union could offer, in terms of tangible benefits, is
Union Privilege.
247
Union Privilege is a non-profit organization established by the AFL-
CIO to provide both union members and nonmember union sympathizers
fringe benefits and consumer services.2'8 The international or national
organization 249 selects which Union Privilege services to offer to its mem-
Even if it were proved that the plaintiff was to have received a far greater profit
than the defendants for a much smaller contribution, the defendant would never-
theless be bound by his agreement by the familiar rule that relative values of the
consideration in a contract between business men dealing at arm's length without
fraud will not affect the validity of the contract ....
Id. (citations omitted).
246. Nonmembers, or "financial core" members, are unable to participate democrati-
cally in collective union decisions about the use of union funds. See Friesen, supra note 2,
at 620.
247. The Union Privilege concept originated from a report by the AFL-CIO Committee
on Work. The report isolated the factors contributing to the decline of unionism and of-
fered a number of constructive solutions to stimulate union resurgence. One suggestion
involved generating employment-related services, such as job training and other fringe
benefits which employers insufficiently provided. The result is the currently burgeoning
Union Privilege program. AFL-CIO Comm. ON THE EVOLUTON OF WoRK<, THE CHANo-
ING SITUATION OF WOR.KERS AND THEIR UNION 14-16 (1985).
248. Currently available Union Privilege programs include a no-annual fee credit card,
low-interest and education loans, special home-mortgage rates for first-time purchasers,
supplemental term life insurance, discount legal advice, mail service pharmacy and car
rental. AFL-CIO, UNION PVIvLEGE, AFL-CIO, LEA)ERSHIP GUmE TO USING UNION
PRIVILEGE BEmNFrrs (1993).
249. The structure of unions is loosely analogous to the two-tiered federalist system of
the United States Government: (1) a centralized national or international body; and (2) an
amalgamation of scattered locals that respond to membership needs on a daily basis. The
details of the interrelationship of local and national/international responsibilities vary from
union to union. Respective obligations are set forth in the national/international and local
constitutions as permitted under the LMRDA. This arrangement evolved from eclectic
historical response to the need for standardized employment conditions that was created
by increased employee mobility, among other factors. See generally LABOR RELATIONS
LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 6-11 (Leon S. Merrifield et al. eds, 1989).
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bership.5 0 The locals then submit membership lists to the Union Privi-
lege office, where members are evaluated for service eligibility on an
individual basis. The international and local organizations could agree to
include Beck waivees on their membership rosters, enabling waivees to
be considered for admission to the Union Privilege associate program.251
III. WAIVER OF THE RIGrr TO REsIGN
Waiver of the "right to resign" differs from waiver of Beck rights in two
significant ways. Both differences stem from the fact that checkoff au-
thorization is explicitly provided for by statute, unlike the right to re-
sign.252 First, it is anticipated that waiver of Beck rights can be achieved
by tinkering with the language of the dues checkoff authorization form
itself. 5 3 By contrast, waiver of the right to resign will require a separate
contract.5 4 Second, the Taft-Hartley Act limits the duration of dues
checkoff authorization to the lesser of twelve months or the expiration
date of the contractL5 5 The right to resign is not specifically addressed by
the statute, nor does the statute address the permissible time frame for
putative waiver of the right to resign.5 6
250. Michael J. McDermott, A Home of Your Own, UNION PLus, Winter 1991, at 12,
12-13 (outlining hurdles to home-ownership and benefits of Union-Privilege assistance).
251. Telephone interview with Cathy Van Helden, Director of Union Services (June 25,
1993) (describing the associate program and its use in union organizing campaigns).
252. Section 302(c)(4) of the Taft-Hartley Act legalizes and describes the requirements
for checkoff. 29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(4) (1988). For text of the statute, see supra note 11.
253. Dues checkoff authorizations are assignments of dues. Waivers of the right to re-
voke checkoff are usually incorporated into the language of the checkoff authorization.
Since Beck rights relate to dues, language clearly waiving the right to receive dues rebate
on the checkoff authorization form itself rather than on a separate contract would be rea-
sonable and expedient. See Sales, Serv., & Allied Workers Union, Local No. 80 (Capitol-
Husting Co.), 235 N.L.R.B. 1264, 1265 (1978).
254. It could be argued that, because, under NLRB v. General Motors, the only legally
enforceable requirement of membership is dues payment, in waiving the right to resign, the
employee is merely waiving her right to stop paying dues. See NLRB v. General Motors
Corp., 373 U.S. 734 (1963). According to this line of reasoning, the resignation right is
equivalent to a dues-paying obligation, which is the subject matter of checkoff authoriza-
tions. Therefore, resignation rights might also be waivable on the checkoff form itself.
However, since resignation rights invite a host of possible limitations from other sources,
i.e., the doctrine of unconscionability, a separate contract is preferable. For further expla-
nation of this position, see discussion infra notes 252-367 and accompanying text.
255. 29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(4). For text of statute, see supra note 11.
256. The Lockheed Board, in specifically leaving open the question of waiver of resig-
nation rights, stated that "we need not, and do not, decide whether or not an employee
may, by authorization or other form of contract that he signs as an individual, agree to an
enforceable waiver of the right to resign for a limited period." Lockheed, 302 N.L.R.B.
322, 328 n.25 (1991) (emphasis added).
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In assessing the waivability of the right to resign, the fact that the right
is not explicit in the statute impacts analysis of the nature of the right.
The nature of the right to resign must be gleaned from the overall scheme
of the NLRA, as affected by the Taft-Hartley amendments and the judi-
cial gloss on resignation in the context of union discipline. 57 Statutory
silence regarding the duration of waiver of the right to resign will affect
the manner of waiver, once waivability of the right is established.
A. Nature of the Right to Resign
1. Taft-Hartley Induced Tug of War
The 1947 Taft-Hartley amendments injected a dynamic tension into the
NLRA between the rights of labor unions and the rights of individuals to
choose or reject union participation.2s8 Nowhere is this tension more evi-
dent than between Sections 7 and 8 of the Act. 9 Section 7 guarantees
employees the right to engage in or, as amended by Taft-Hartley, refrain
from any or all union activities. 260 Section 8(b)(1)(A) renders union re-
straint or coercion of employees in the exercise of their Section 7 rights
an unfair labor practice.261 Congress, in establishing the individual em-
257. "Union Discipline" refers to the types of punitive rules a union may legally impose
upon its members. For a trenchant article pointing out the need for an intelligible theory
to rationalize limitations on union discipline (a need which has yet to be met), see Clyde
W. Summers, Legal Limitations on Union Discipline, 64 HARV. L. REv. 1049 (1951). Pro-
fessor Summers proposed that courts should recognize that "a union member is essentially
a citizen within an industrial government." Id. at 1101. Therefore, courts should simply
prescribe the minimum standards necessary to protect the employee within that govern-
ment, although "[t]he problem will still be the difficult one of defining an individual's
rights within a democratic society." Id. Professor Summers described the double-edged
sword of union discipline as follows:
Union discipline is only one of the many facets of union government, but it
frequently reflects the most stubborn problems of union democracy. Discipline of
individual members is essential if a union is to survive as an effective organiza-
tion, but discipline may also be a ready tool of oppression within the union.
There is a twilight zone between these two uses rather than a clear line of
demarcation.
Id. at 1049 (footnote omitted).
258. See Keltner W. Locke, The Evolution of a Doctrine: A Union Member's Right to
Resign, 3 DEr. C.L. REv. 709 (1986).
259. Id.
260. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1988). Section 7 guarantees employees the right to "form, join, or
assist labor organizations," and also "the right to refrain from any or all of such activities
except to the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring member-
ship in a labor organization as a condition of employment as authorized in section [8(a)(3)
of the Act]." Id. § 158(a)(3).
261. 29 U.S.C. § 158(8)(b)(1)(A). Section 8(b)(1)(A) forbids union restraints on an
employee's right to engage in or refrain from concerted activity for mutual aid and protec-
tion. However, the proviso to Section 8(b)(1)(A) states that Section 8(b)(1)(A) should not
be interpreted to impair union imposition of its own internal rules. Id.
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ployee's right to refrain from union activities, concomitantly balanced
this right by amending Section 8(b)(1)(A) to provide that the obligation
not to restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their Section 7
rights does not impair the right of a labor organization to adopt reason-
able rules with respect to the acquisition or retention of membership in
the organization.26
Despite efforts to offset the increase in individual employee rights by
inclusion of the proviso to Section 8(b)(1)(A), Congress nevertheless im-
posed substantial limitations on the union's power to enforce solidar-
ity.263 Congress categorized its restrictions on unions into two separate
sections of the Act, depending on whether the union's actions influenced
the employee directly or indirectly through union pressure on the em-
ployer.2 4 Ostensibly, indirect pressure applied to the workers' employer
was considered more pernicious, because Congress placed tighter stric-
tures on this category of union activity.265 Labor unions are prohibited
from violating Section 8(a)(3) of Taft-Hartley by seeking employer dis-
crimination against an employee for any reason except the employee's
"failure to tender the periodic dues and the initiation fees uniformly re-
quired as a condition of acquiring or retaining membership., 266 By com-
parison, Congress treated union action aimed directly at the individual
employee more liberally.267 Perhaps such tolerance sprang in part from
recognition that unions, like any voluntary association, must be permitted
some leeway to govern their internal affairs.268 Consequently, in declar-
ing union restraint or coercion of employees in the exercise of their Sec-
tion 7 rights an unfair labor practice pursuant to Section 8(b)(1)(A),
Congress retained the right of labor organizations to govern their internal
affairs, including disciplining their members.
269
The right to resign is born of this bipolar pull between the individual's
right to refrain and the union's right to promulgate rules pertaining to
262. Id. The Section states that "this paragraph shall not impair the right of a labor
organization to prescribe its own rules with respect to the acquisition or retention of mem-
bership." Id
263. 29 U.S.C. §§ 157, 158(c)(4). For another example of congressional limitation on
union efforts to maintain solidarity, see Title 1 of the Labor Management Reporting and
Disclosure Act of 1959 (LMRDA). 29 U.S.C. 99 481-484 (1988) (regulating discipline of
union members with respect to their intraunion political activities).
264. See Locke, supra note 258 at 710-11.
265. Id. Pursuant to Section 8(b)(2) of Taft-Hartley, a union cannot elicit employer
discrimination against an employee unless the employee fails to pay dues or initiation fees.
29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(2).
266. Id.
267. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)(A).
268. See Hartley, supra note 11, at 42-45.
269. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)(A).
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membership acquisition and retention.270 The nature of the right is deter-
mined by NLRB and Supreme Court opinions attempting to accommo-
date this statutorily-imposed dichotomy. To isolate the nature of the
right to resign, several pivotal opinions are examined below.
2. Membership Resignaion-"Fine" or Finable?
In NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Co.,271 the Supreme Court
held that, where the fined employee was a current union member, a
union's court-enforcement of a fine for acts such as strikebreaking was
within the scope of internal union affairs as defined by the Section
8(b)(1)(A) proviso." In reaching its decision, the Court interpreted
union membership as a contract.273 The Court implied that enforcement
of penalties was no more a restraint or coercion than punishments im-
posed on citizens for failure to comply with civic obligations such as in-
come tax filings.274 The majority opinion stressed the NLRA's sanction
of majority rule and employees' right to engage in collective action. 275
Union democracy, as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Allis-Chal-
mers, mandates that the union majority should be able to compel individ-
ual members to comply with the majority's decision.
2 76
270. Pattern Makers' League, AFL-CIO v. NLRB, 473 U.S. 95, 116 (1985) (White, J.,
concurring) ("The [Section 7] right to join or not join a labor union includes the right to
resign and § 8(b)(1)(A) forbids unions to interfere with that right" except for promulga-
tion of rules pertaining to membership acquisition and retention.).
271. 388 U.S. 175 (1967).
272. Id. at 181-82. The Court indicated that fines are permitted as long as not coer-
cively steep, vague, or violative of procedural guarantees. Id at 192-93. The strikebreak-
ing members in Allis-Chalmers had "[e]ach executed the pledge of allegiance to the UAW
constitution and [taken] the oath of full membership.... [T]wo disciplined employees
testified that they had fully participated in the proceedings leading to the strike. They
attended the meetings at which the secret strike vote and renewed strike vote were taken."
Id. at 196.
273. Id. at 179; see also Abraham, supra note 57, at 1305 n.163. Abraham states:
In construing union membership as a contract, the Court looked at it as one
rather like a constitution, to which the concept of "adhesion" would not apply....
[A]lthough the union member may not bargain over the terms of his membership
contract, the union's constitution, bylaws, and such are the fruits of a process that
must be democratic and may be revised or repealed.
Id. For further discussion of contracts of adhesion, dickered terms, and the doctrine of
unconscionability, see discussion infra notes 341-57 and accompanying text.
274. Allis-Chalmers, 388 U.S. at 179 (stating that the obligation went no further than
"enforcement of penalties imposed on citizens for violation of their obligations... to pay
income taxes, or court awards ... for nonperformance of a contractual obligation").
275. Id. at 180. "The [national labor] policy therefore extinguishes the individual em-
ployee's power to order his own relations with his employer and creates a power vested in
the chosen representative to act in the interests of all employees." Id.
276. Accord Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community Org., 420 U.S.
50, 62 (1975) (indicating that "[Section 7 rights] are, for the most part, collective rights,
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The dissenting opinion, by contrast, focused on the Section 7 right of
individual employees to refrain from union activity. The dissent reasoned
that the union's suing in state court to enforce an internal union fine, as
opposed to "merely" expelling a strikebreaker from membership, was not
sufficiently internal to be protected by the Section 8(b)(1)(A) proviso
that permits union rules regarding acquisition and retention of union
membership. 277 One scholar concluded that "[t]he dissenters.., thereby
began the restoration, in the labor law area, of the pristine world of freely
contracting atomistic individuals."278
To resolve the conflict between the majority and dissenting opinions in
Allis-Chalmers, "another concept was needed: the voluntariness of union
membership." '279 The voluntary agreement to be bound by union rules
seemed to provide the basis for evaluating the fairness of union discipline
for the member's breach of a union rule."0
In Scofield v. NLRB, 1 1 the Supreme Court upheld a union rule
designed to prohibit "rate-breaking" by members compensated on a
piece-rate basis. 2 The Court's reasoning centered on voluntariness: em-
ployees had chosen to join the union and they were "free to leave the
union and escape the rule." 3 The Scofield opinion established that
union rules were enforceable in court when the rule "reflects a legitimate
union interest, impairs no policy Congress has imbedded in the labor
laws, and is reasonably enforced against union members who are free to
leave the union and escape the rule."'
rights to act in concert with one's fellow employees; they are protected not for their own
sake but as an instrument of national labor policy of minimizing industrial strife 'by encour-
aging the practice and procedure of collective bargaining"' (emphasis added)).
277. As Justice Black wrote for the dissent:
It is one thing to say that Congress did not wish to interfere with the union's
power, similar to that of any other kind of voluntary association, to prescribe
specific conditions of membership. It is quite another thing to say that Congress
intended to leave unions free to exercise a court-like power to try and punish
members with a direct economic sanction for exercising their right to work.
Allis-Chalmers, 388 U.S. at 203 (Black, J., dissenting).
278. Abraham, supra note 57, at 1307.
279. Locke, supra note 258, at 713. Locke states that "[sle long as an employee's agree-
ment to be bound by union rules was voluntary, union discipline for breaching that obliga-
tion seemed less offensive." Ii.
280. Id.
281. 394 U.S. 423 (1969).
282. Id.
283. Id. at 430. The Court found that nonmember employees engaged in the same task
were not subject to the union rule. Id.
284. Id. The Supreme Court has since refined the three-pronged test. See NLRB v.
Boeing Co., 412 U.S. 67,74 (1973) (stating that the NLRB is not empowered by the Act to
assess the reasonableness of fines). One scholar noted that "[o]ne might reasonably ask
whether Boeing should not also apply to fines imposed for violation of commitments law-
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Three years later the Supreme Court encountered a factual scenario in
which the employees had literally taken Scofield at its word and resigned
before becoming strikebreakers to escape the union rule and incumbent
discipline. 8 In NLRB v. Granite State Joint Board, Textile Workers Lo-
cal 1029,286 the Supreme Court held that by fining the strikebreakers, the
union had unlawfully coerced the employees in their right to refrain from
striking, despite the fact that each strikebreaker had participated in both
the vote to strike and the vote to authorize fines against strikebreakers.
287
The key to Textile Workers was that neither the union constitution, its by-
laws, nor the collective bargaining agreement included any provision
clearly delineating the conditions for membership resignation.8 The
next logical step was for unions to include resignation restrictions in their
constitutions.289
Unions created essentially two kinds of resignation restrictions.290 The
first type forbid acceptance of employment during a lockout or with a
struck employer and also provided that resignation would not relieve the
fully undertaken by union members not to engage in strikebreaking." Abraham, supra
note 57, at 1311 n.204. Abraham's suggestion that the Board should not involve itself in
evaluating the reasonableness of fines where union members have abrogated their volun-
tary promise not to break a strike supports the thesis of this Comment that clear and
unmistakable waiver of statutory rights, such as the right to resign, provides a rationale for
decreasing Board intervention in the union-member relationship.
285. See NLRB v. Granite State Joint Bd., Textile Workers Local 1029, 409 U.S. 213
(1972). The collective bargaining agreement at issue in Textile Workers contained a main-
tenance of membership clause requiring members to remain in good standing "as to pay-
ment of dues" for the duration of the contract. Shortly before the collective bargaining
agreement expired, the union members voted to strike if no agreement was reached prior
to a prearranged deadline. When the deadline passed before agreement had been reached,
strike and picketing ensued. The union membership subsequently passed a resolution to
fine any member "aiding or abetting" the employer during the strike. Id. at 214.
286. Id. at 213.
287. Id. at 214, 218-19. The Court similarly upheld an NLRB opinion that suit in state
court by a union to enforce fines against employees who had tendered membership resig-
nations prior to becoming strikebreakers constituted an unfair labor practice. Booster
Lodge No. 405, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. NLRB, 412 U.S. 84 (1973).
288. Textile Workers, 409 U.S. at 214. Justice Douglas opined for the majority:
[t]he power of the union over the member is certainly no greater than the union-
member contract. Where a member lawfully resigns from a union and thereafter
engages in conduct which the union rule proscribes, the union commits an unfair
labor practice when it seeks enforcement of fines for that conduct .... [When
there is a lawful dissolution of a union-member relation, the union has no more
control over the former member than it has over the man in the street.
Id. at 217.
289. J. Mark Gidley, Note, A Union's Right to Control Strike-Period Resignations, 85
COLUM. L. Rnv. 338, 342 n.19 (1985) (collecting examples of resignation restrictions in
various union constitutions).
290. Locke, supra note 258, at 714. Within these two general categories are further
temporal limitations, i.e., restrictions on resignation during strike periods only or during
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resignee from her obligation not to accept such employment 2 91 The sec-
ond form of restriction prohibited resignation during a strike or when a
strike seemed imminent.2 2
The first type of restriction was rejected by the NLRB in Machinists
Local 1327.293 The Board analyzed a union rule providing that resigna-
tion would not relieve a member's obligation to honor the picket line if
the member resigned either fourteen days prior to establishment of the
picket line or during the period that the picket line is maintained. The
Board concluded that the rule constituted an unlawful restriction on the
member's right to resign,294 but left open the question of what restrictions
on resignation, if any, would be lawful.29 The Supreme Court has not
definitively ruled on this issue. 296
both strike and nonstrike periods; and occasional stipulation that leadership must approve
all resignation requests. See Gidley, supra note 289, at 342 n.19.
291. See, e.g., Machinists Local 1327, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists, 231 N.L.R.B. 719 (1977),
enforcement denied, 725 F.2d 1212 (9th Cir. 1979). The rule in the union's constitution
stated:
"Improper Conduct of a Member:... Accepting employment in any capacity in
an establishment where a strike or lockout exists as recognized under this Consti-
tution, without permission. Resignation shall not relieve a member of his obliga-
tion to refrain from accepting employment at the establishment for the duration
of the strike or lockout within 14 days preceding its commencement..
Id. at 1214 (quoting union's constitution).
292. See, e.g., Pattern Makers' League v. NLRB, 473 U.S. 95, 97 (1985) (exemplifying
the second form of restriction). The Pattern Makers' union constitution provided: "'[n]o
resignation or withdrawal from an Association, or from the League, shall be accepted dur-
ing a strike or lockout, or at a time when a strike or lockout appears imminent."' Id.
(quoting union's constitution).
293. 231 N.L.R.B. 719 (1977).
294. Machinists Local 1327, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, 263
N.L.R.B. 984, 993 (1982), enforcement denied, 115 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2972 (9th Cir. 1984),
overruled by International Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, Local Lodge 1414,
270 N.L.R.B. 1330 (1984). In Machinists Local 1327, the Board split on this issue. Two
Board Members declared they would permit a union rule restricting member resignation
for 30 days subsequent to tender of resignation "to protect the interests of employees who
maintain their membership" and "to dispose of administrative matters arising from such
resignation." I. at 987. IWo Board members found "any restriction imposed upon a
union member's right to resign to be unreasonable." If. at 988. Two years later the Board
determined that any.restriction on a union member's resignation was unlawful. Interna-
tional Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, Local Lodge 1414, 270 N.L.R.B. 1330
(1984).
295. The Board ultimately concluded that any restriction on a union member's right to
resign constitutes unlawful coercion. See International Ass'n of Machinists, Local Lodge
1414, 270 N.L.R.B. 1330, 1333 (1984).
296. Some commentators, however, interpret the Supreme Court's decision in Pattern
Makers' as precluding all forms of union restrictions on the right to resign. See, e.g.,
Colette M. Foissotte, Comment, Justice Brennan and Union Discipline Under the NLRA:
The Fight For Solidarity Impinges Upon Individual Rights, 20 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 127
(1986); Douglas H. Wiegerink, Note, Unions Are Forced to Loosen Their Grip On Mem-
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In Pattern Makers' v. NLRB, 297 the Supreme Court held that union
discipline of a strikebreaker who resigned in violation of a constitutional
provision prohibiting resignation during a strike or when a strike is immi-
nent is an unfair labor practice. 9 The Court reached this conclusion de-
spite the fact that the strikebreakers had participated in both the strike
vote as well as the vote that amended the union's constitution to prohibit
resignation. 99
The Supreme Court narrowly framed the issue as "whether the Board's
construction of section 8(b)(1)(A) is reasonable. "3 0 Although the Court
interpreted the language of the statute and "tinkered modestly with con-
gressional history," 301 the text of the opinion reiterates the Court's duty
of deference to the Board.3 2 Justice White, who provided the pivotal
fifth vote, so grounded his concurring opinion on deference to the Board
that he acknowledged that had the Board's opinion come out the oppo-
site and upheld the union rule, he would still have affirmed the Board's
decision.30 3
In dissent, Justice Blackmun took issue with the majority's concept of
"voluntary unionism."3°  The dissent argued that freedom of choice
should require an individual to be bound by the choice that she has freely
made.305 The dissent buttressed its opinion with inferences from legisla-
bers-Pattern Makers' League of North America, AFL-CIO v. NLRB, 22 WAKE FORESr
L. REv. 367 (1987). This line of interpretation, however, de-emphasizes the crucial fact
that the Supreme Court in Pattern Makers' merely deferred to the Board's expertise in
administering the NLRA. Pattern Makers', 473 U.S. at 101. The Court never explicitly
stated that all restrictions on resignation, such as those provided by a separate contract as
proposed by this Comment, would be invalid. Id. at 101, 102 n.9 ("In both Textile Workers,
409 U.S. at 217, and Machinists, 412 U.S. at 88, the Court explicitly left open the question
of "the extent to which contractual restriction on a member's right to resign may be limited
by the Act.").
297. 473 U.S. 95 (1984).
298. Id.
299. The Supreme Court failed to find in such democratic participation the requisite
"voluntariness" needed to support the policy of "voluntary unionism" embedded in the
NLRA. Id. at 114.
300. Id.
301. Abraham, supra note 57, at 1329. For a full discussion of legislative intent and the
conclusion that Congress intended to permit waiver of the right to resign, see J. Mark
Gidley, supra note 289. See also Kevin C. Marcoux, Comment, Section 8(b)(1)(A) from
Allis-Chalmers to Pattern Makers' League. A Case Study in Judicial Legislation, 74 CAL. L.
REv. 1409 (1986) (scrutinizing the legislative history of the Thft-Hartley amendments).
302. Pattern Makers', 473 U.S. at 114. "Where the Board's construction of the Act is
reasonable, it should not be rejected 'merely because the courts might prefer another view
of the statute."' Id. (quoting Ford Motor Co. v. NLRB, 441 U.S. 488, 497 (1979)).
303. Id. at 117.
304. Id. at 126.
305. Locke, supra note 258, at 715. Justice Blackmun observed:
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tive history and Section 13 of the Act, which provides that "[n]othing in
this subchapter, except as specifically provided for herein, shall be con-
strued so as either to interfere with or impede or diminish in any way the
right to strike. ' '30 6 According to Justice Blackmun, the resignation re-
striction in the union's constitution must be preserved because it en-
hances the effectiveness of collective action by promoting the statutory-
protected right to strike. 7
3. Individual Waiver: Free Choice Promotes Voluntary Unionism
Judicial depiction of the right to resign fails to delineate the nature of
the right to the extent that its waivability can be unequivocally estab-
lished.3 °8 Certain salient aspects of the Supreme Court's opinions, how-
ever, suggest that waiver may be possible under particular circumstances.
First, despite deference to the Board's expertise in administering the stat-
ute, the Court has not yet expressly upheld the Board's position that all
restrictions on the right to resign are impermissible. 30 9 Second, the Court
has relied on the concept of voluntary unionism, imbedded in the NLRA,
which implicitly requires that a' union member not be coerced into declin-
ing to exercise her right to refrain from protected, concerted activities.310
Once an employee freely has made the decision to become a member of the
union, has agreed not to resign during a strike, and has had the opportunity to
participate in the decision to strike, his faithfulness to his promise is simply the
quid pro quo for the benefits he has received as a result of his decision to band
together with his fellow workers and to join in collective bargaining.
Pattern Makers', 473 U.S. at 129 (Blackmun, J., dissenting), cited in Locke, supra note 258,
at 715 n.26.
306. 29 U.S.C. § 163 (1988).
307. Pattern Makers', 473 U.S. at 130 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("Enforcement of a
promise not to resign during a strike, then, is not a limitation of a § 7 right, but is a vindica-
tion of that right to act collectively and engage in collective bargaining, so long as the
promise is voluntarily made.").
308. One commentator observed:
The recent cases involving a member's right to convert to "financial core" sta-
tus can be understood as a further extension of the conclusion that a union's
power to fine a member is an internal union matter because the member, as the
Court stated in Scofleld, was "free to leave the union and escape the rule." One
may ask whether there is a circumstance in which an employee can waive his
statutory right to resign. Resolving this question may be the next evolutionary
step in the development of the law.
Locke, supra note 258, at 7171 (quoting Scofield v. NLRB, 394 U.S. 423, 430 (1969)).
309. See Pattern Makers', 473 U.S. at 103 n.13 ("In International Assn. of Machinists,
Local 1414 (Neufeld Porsche-Aud4 Inc.), a majority of the Board held that any restriction
on the right to resign violates the Act. This was the position taken by Chairman Van de
Water and Member Hunter in Machinists Local 1327 (Dalmo Victor II.. . ") (citations
omitted)).
310. See supra notes 288-98 and accompanying text.
1993]
Catholic University Law Review
The Board in Lockheed311 concluded that this policy of voluntary
unionism, which the Supreme Court relied on in Pattern Makers', does
not preclude voluntary waiver of the post-resignation right to revoke
dues checkoff authorization." 2 The acid test for waivability, according to
Lockheed, is voluntariness, as evidenced by the clear and unmistakable
waiver of each individual employee involved.313 The Supreme Court has
determined that participating in the vote to amend the union constitution
to prohibit resignation during strikes and presence during the strike vote
are insufficient to constitute clear and unmistakable waiver of the right to
resign. 31 4 Though a member may voluntarily participate in the collective
decision to amend the union constitution to prohibit strike-period resig-
nations and vote to strike, such participation may be inadequate to safe-
guard an employee's right to refrain from union activity, including
striking, because the individual employee may be the minority vote.315
Nevertheless, the minority employee is bound by the decision of the ma-
jority. In effect, her vote is subsumed by the majority's, and there is no
way to ascertain whether the employee intended to waive her right to
resign. A resignation restriction in a union constitution or even a collec-
tive bargaining agreement, however, differs from an individually exe-
cuted contract waiving the right to resign in that the latter more clearly
effectuates individual freedom of choice by means of freedom of con-
tract.316 Consequently, the employee's vote cannot constitute a suffi-
311. 302 N.L.R.B. 322 (1991).
312. The Lockheed Board explicitly left unanswered the question "whether or not an
employee may, by authorization or other form of contract that he signs as an individual,
agree to an enforceable waiver of the right to resign for a limited period." Id at 328 n.35.
313. Id. at 327; see also Locke, supra note 258, at 717 ("One may argue that agreeing to
a limitation on the right to resign is more than a matter of contract law; that it really is
tantamount to waiving a statutory right. Therefore, to be effective, such waiver must be
clear and unequivocal."). Accord Metropolitan Edison Co. v. NLRB, 460 U.S. 693, 708,
709 n.12 (1983); Conoco, Inc. v. NLRB, 740 F.2d 811, 815 (10th Cir. 1984) ("Waiver will not
be inferred, but must be explicit.").
314. See Pattern Makers' League v. NLRB, 473 U.S. 95, 115-16 (1985).
315. Waiver of Section 7 rights, including the right to refrain from collective activity by
resigning, must be patently clear. See, e.g., Metropolitan Edison, 460 U.S. at 708-09, 709 n.
12. Where a union member is part of the minority faction voting against waiving resigna-
tion rights, the member emphatically cannot be said to have unequivocally waived her right
to resign. Certain statutory rights deemed collective rights, such as the right to strike, are
waivable by the union on behalf of its members. See, e.g., NLRB v. Magnavox Co., 415
U.S. 322, 325 (1974) (strike waiver quid pro quo for arbitration). However, the right to
resign, as viewed through the prism of Supreme Court and Board precedent, appears to
inhere in the individual. See, e.g., Pattern Makers', 473 U.S. at 104. Therefore, the right, if
waived at all, must be clearly waived by the individual.
316. The Supreme Court has expressly avoided determining whether members may
contract away their resignation rights. See Booster Lodge, 412 U.S. at 88 ("We leave open
the question of the extent to which a contractual restriction on a member's right to resign
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ciently clear and unmistakable waiver to the extent that an individual
contract, or an individual execution of a checkoff authorization, can. In-
deed, the Lockheed Board pointed out that the Pattern Makers' Court
"did not pass on the efficacy of individual agreements."
317
B. Other Sources of Potential Limitations on Resignation Waiver
TWo legal constructs command attention as potential candidates for re-
stricting waiver of resignation rights: the Thirteenth Amendment and the
doctrine of unconscionability. Accordingly, both potential sources of
waiver limitation will be explored briefly.
1. The Thirteenth Amendment
The Thirteenth Amendment318 provides a possible source of restriction
on waiver of the right to resign union membership." 9 Commonly pige-
onholed as the amendment that abolished the private institution of slav-
ery,320 the text3 21 and legislative history3" of the Thirteenth Amendment
permit a far more expansive interpretation. Indeed, recent reexamina-
may be limited by the Act."). Accord Textile Workers, 409 U.S. at 219 (refusing to decide
"to what extent the contractual relationship between union and member may curtail the
freedom to resign"). See also Gidley, supra note 289, at 364 ("Even if Section 7 grants
workers a right to resign during strike periods, then, it is consistent with established labor
policy, as well as the law of voluntary associations, to allow workers the freedom to waive
this right by agreement.").
317. Lockheed, 302 N.L.R.B. at 328 n.25. Cf. United Mine Workers (Canturbury Coal
Co.), 305 N.L.R.B. 516, 519 (1991) (holding unenforceable individual contracts of employ-
ees who promised to repay the union the amount of money received from the selective
strike fund in the event of crossover during a strike are unenforceable).
318. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1 ("Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except
as a punishment for a crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist
within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.).
319. Unlike the Fourteenth Amendment, state action is not required to trigger Thir-
teenth Amendment protection. Compare U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1 with U.S. CONST.
amend. XIII, § 1. Therefore private action, such as that of a union, can be reached by the
Thirteenth Amendment.
320. See Herman Belz, The Civil War Amendments to the Constitution: The Relevance
of Original Intent, 5 CONST. COmMENTARY 115, 139-40 (1988). But see Pope, supra note
53, at 1096 ("The Supreme Court has long held that the thirteenth amendment not only
abolished slavery, but also 'established universal freedom' and mandated a 'basic system of
free labor' ..... " (footnotes omitted)).
321. Pope, supra note 53, at 1099.
322. See Lea S. VanderVelde, The Labor Vision of the Thirteenth Amendment, 138 U.
PA. L. REv. 437, 437 (1989) ("The texts of the congressional debates on the amendment ...
contain a far richer vision of constitutional reform. They address what constitutes fair and
just labor relations."); see also G. Sidney Buchanan, The Quest for Freedom: A Legal His-
tory of the Thirteenth Amendment, 12 Hous. L. Rav. 1 (1974).
1993]
Catholic University Law Review
tion of the Reconstruction3" debates unearthed a yet-unrealized, com-
prehensive labor goal-free labor.3"
The Congress that convened at the close of the Civil War faced the
daunting task of implementing the goals of the Union in a divided, if not
shattered, nation.3" One of the most pressing issues confronting Con-
gress was the effect of the elimination of the slave status of four million
laborers who had buttressed the economy of an entire region.326 Con-
gress must have been cognizant of the profound impact emancipation
would have on the legal ordering of labor relations.327 Slaves occupied
the bottom step of a hierarchical stairway of labor status, that stairway
progressing from "peons, bonded servants, apprentices, [and] employees
not under written contract" to professionals.32 Abolition of slavery re-
moved the bottom step, flooding the labor market at the next higher
level. Heightened awareness of the plight of the "wage slave" factory
workers of the North translated into recognition of the need to accord the
wage-slave laborer liberty equivalent to that of his newly-emancipated
brethren.329 The Thirteenth Amendment reflects this quest to protect la-
bor liberty on a grander scale than the modest language of the amend-
ment reveals.330
The text of the Thirteenth Amendment was chosen for its symbolic as-
sociation with President Jefferson.331 Congress borrowed the phrase
"neither slavery nor involuntary servitude" from the text of the North-
west Ordinance.332 In grafting Jefferson's words onto the text of the new
amendment, Congress assuaged its discomfort with altering a revered
323. The term "Reconstruction" or "Reconstruction Congress" denotes the Congress
which convened after the close of the Civil War to rebuild or "reconstruct" the nation. See
1 BRUCE ACKERMAN WE THE PEOPLE 44 (1991) ("Reconstruction was just that-rebuild-
ing the Union from the ground up.").
324. Senator Harry Wilson explained the position of the advocates for the Thirteenth
Amendment as follows:
[W]e have advocated the rights of the black man because the black man was the
most oppressed type of the toiling men of this country. . . The same influences
that go to keep down and crush down the rights of the poor black man bear down
and oppress the poor white laboring man.
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 343 (1866).




329. Pope, supra note 53, at 1102; Buchanan, supra note 322, at 11.
330. Buchanan, supra note 322, at 7.
331. VanderVelde, supra note 322, at 449, 450 n.70. Although the words assumed
"mythical proportions" for the Reconstruction Congress because they were attributed to
Jefferson, some historical evidence indicates that Jefferson did not draft the phrase.
332. VanderVelde, supra note 322, at 450 (citing CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess.
1488 (1864) (remarks of Sen. Dolittle and Sen. Summer)).
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document by accomplishing the transformation via the authority of a
founding father.333 The debates thus focused on the objectives and ef-
fects of the amendment, rather than its text.
334
Contemporary legal scholars stress that the oblique albeit capacious
term "involuntary servitude" suggests that the drafters of the Thirteenth
Amendment intended to borrow one of "those 'vague and elastic' con-
cepts 'purposely left to gather meaning from experience.' '- 335 Indeed,
courts have interpreted the words "involuntary servitude" to outlaw per-
sonal service contracts, thereby granting employees at least a limited right
to quit.336 If the Thirteenth Amendment can be interpreted to forbid
employers from forcing employees to work for them, the question persists
whether it would also prohibit unions from enforcing contracts signed by
members who promised not to resign. A possible clue to answering this
question lies in the fact that covenants not to compete3 37 do not violate
the Thirteenth Amendment. In other words, under some circumstances
employees may contract away their individual labor liberty.338 To with-
stand scrutiny on contract grounds, however, covenants not to compete
333. Id. Cf. ACKERMAN, supra note 323, at 40-47 (discussing the Thirteenth Amend-
ment's dramatic departure from the basic procedures for constitutional revision provided
for by the nation's founders, including the stricture of federalism).
334. VanderVelde, supra note 322, at 451.
335. Pope, supra note 53, at 1099 (quoting National Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer
Co., 337 U.S. 382, 646 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)).
336. VanderVelde, supra note 322, at 489. VanderVelde states:
From the texts of the debates, there is little doubt that Congress intended to
accord workers the right to quit, but the parameters of this right were more com-
plex. In addition to widespread agreement to prohibit specific performance of
labor contracts, speakers repeatedly raised the specter of laborers forcibly being
dragged back to either their former masters or their new employers and subjected
to the boss's will.
I. (footnotes omitted).
337. Covenants not to compete are agreements not to compete with the employer sub-
sequent to terminating employment. Harlan M. Blake, Employee Agreements Not to Com-
pete, 73 HARV. L. Rav. 625, 625 n.1 (1960). Some courts have analogized covenants not to
compete to the Thirteenth Amendment's prohibition of involuntary servitude. See, e.g.,
Oak Cliff Ice Delivery Co. v. Peterson, 300 S.W. 107, 111 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927) (giving
heightened scrutiny to avoid "industrial servitude"). However, noncompetition agree-
ments are actually converse to involuntary servitude: rather than forcing the employee's
choice of new employment options. See Maureen B. Callahan, Post-Employment Restraint
Agreements: A Reassessment, 52 U. Cmi. L. Rnv. 703, 719 n.61 (1985).
338. See, e.g., Schmidt v. Central Laundry & Supply Co., 13 N.Y.S..2d 817,823 (Sup. Ct.
1939) (holding that employee's liberty is uppermost in assessing the effect of post-employ-
ment restraint agreements); Arthur Murray Dance Studios, Inc. v. Whitter, 105 N.E.2d 685,
692 (Ohio C.P. 1962) (stating that the benchmark for assessing the validity of an agreement
is whether it is "unduly harsh and oppressive on the employee"). But see Callahan, supra
note 337, at 718-19 ("But personal freedom includes freedom of contract, and the freedom
to contract by definition allows the voluntary restriction of one's options.").
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must be reasonable in terms of time and geographical scope. 3 9 Although
the factor of geographical location is irrelevant to the issue of waivability
of resignation rights, the time dimension is significant.34" Law pertaining
to covenants not to compete indicates that the key to unlocking a Thir-
teenth Amendment challenge may be found in the concepts of voluntari-
ness (covenants not to compete must be voluntarily assumed) and
duration.
2. Unconscionability
Since voluntarism3 1 is the underlying rationale for permitting waiver
of resignation rights, a crucial issue is how to assure that the employee's
assumption of contractual obligation is voluntary. Such assurance is
problematic because the transaction occurs between a single individual
and a "colossal" union.34 2 Moreover, because the not-so-hidden agenda
lurking behind resignation waiver is to furnish solidarity during a strike,
339. For an extensive list of cases, grouped by jurisdiction and in terms of the geo-
graphic extent of the restriction, see Annotation, Enforceability of Restrictive Covenant,
Ancillary to Employment Contract, as Affected by Territorial Extent of Restriction, 43
A.L.R.2D 94 (1955); Annotation, Enforceability of Restrictive Covenant, Ancillary to Em-
ployment Contract, as Affected by Duration of Restriction, 41 A.L.R.2D 15 (1955).
340. See Blake, supra note 337, at 677-78 (discussing reasonable time restraints tailored
to suit the circumstances of the restrictive covenant). Recall the importance of time limita-
tions on duration of checkoff authorization, 28 U.S.C. § 186(c)(4), and statutorily imposed
time restraints on duration of the contract bar, infra note 359, among other pertinent tem-
poral limitations.
341. Betty Mensch, Freedom of Contract as Ideology, 33 STAN. L. Rsv. 753,763 (1981)
(book review). "[A] present exchange of goods or promises is a pure expression of volun-
tarism. In turn, this expression of voluntarism required intelligible legal rules to separate
free bargains from those formed under fraud, duress, or undue influence." I& (footnotes
omitted).
342. After all, the premise behind promoting unions in a democracy is that the individ-
ual laborer is imbued with insufficient bargaining clout to counteract the strength of the
employer. See Vegelahn v. Guntner, 44 N.E. 1077, 1081 (1896) (Homes, J., dissenting)
("Combination on the one side [management] is patent and powerful. Combination on the
other [labor] is the necessary and desirable counterpart, if the battle is to be carried on in a
fair and equal way."). Similarly, the lone laborer loses his significance when up against the
collective union.
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where the individual's economic interests are at stake, problems of du-
ress343 and unconscionability 344 emerge.345
Traditional nineteenth century "will theorists" believed that volunta-
rism was the core of contractual obligation, and thus contracts required
assent.34 In fashioning a body of duress precedent, the bottom line was
the reality of the assent3 47 Later critics attacked both the notion of "free
will" as the paradigm of contract relations and the vaunted neutrality of
the government as enforcer of private will. Such early twentieth century
thinkers perceived that "all contracting involves a measure of coercion,
and that the advantaged person enjoys that position because the legal
system has created entitlements for him. 3 48 To counteract this coercion
in extreme circumstances, the doctrine of unconscionability evolved.
The purpose of the doctrine of unconscionability is to counteract coer-
cion through prevention of oppression and unfair surprise.349 This bifur-
cation of purpose has led to a distinction between substantive
(oppression) and procedural (unfair surprise) unconscionability.35° Case
law indicates that inequality of bargaining power, lack of meaningful
343. RESTATEMENT (SncoND) oF CoNTRAcTs § 175(1) (1979). Section 175(1) singles
out the factor of assent; voiding contracts to which manifestation of assent has been "in-
duced by an improper threat ... that leaves the victim no reasonable alternative." Id.
344. The term "unconscionability" has been defined as that which "affronts the sense of
decency." Gimbel Bros. v. Swift, 307 N.Y.S.2d 952,954 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1970). The term has
also been defined as "an absence of meaningful choice on the part of one of the parties
together with contract terms which are unreasonably favorable to the other party." Wil-
liams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (citation omit-
ted). The dictionary adds "lying outside the limits of what is reasonable or acceptable:
shockingly unfair, harsh or unjust." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEw INT'L DICTIONARY 2486
(1981).
345. See Clare Dalton, An Essay in the Deconstruction of Contract Doctrine, 94 YALE
L. 997, 1025 (1985) ("The story of the doctrines of duress and unconscionability reveals
... efforts over time to create a private domain in which individuals can reach binding
agreements and courts can enforce them, despite the difficulties presented by the problem
of power.").
346. See John P. Dawson, Economic Duress-An Essay in Perspective, 45 MicH. L.
REv. 253, 256 (1947); see also Mensch, supra note 341, at 763.
347. Dalton, supra note 345, at 1027.
348. Id. at 1029 (quoting Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coer-
cive State, 38 POL. Sci. Q. 470, 472 (1923)).
349. U.C.C. § 2-302 cmt. 1 (1987). Dalton comments:
[o]ne way of explaining the place of unconscionability in the body of contract
doctrine is to describe it as the public face of a concern for which duress and fraud
then appear as the private expressions. An unconscionable contract is one that
shocks the public conscience. Duress and fraud concentrate, by comparison, on
the effect of the coercive or fraudulent conduct on the contractual capacity of the
affected party.
Dalton, supra note 345, at 1036.
350. See Arthur A. Leff, Unconscionability and the Code: The Emperor's New Clause,
115 U. PA. L. REv. 485 (1967).
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choice, or a situation where freedom of contract is exploited by a stronger
party in control of negotiations are important factors in finding
unconscionability.
352
An unlimited duration of waiver of the right to resign is arguably op-
pressive in that unforeseeable circumstances could necessitate that the
employee have the opportunity at some point to change her mind.
Where the employee is not provided with adequate notice to allow her to
understand the ramifications of the decision to waive her resignation
rights, such as permanent replacement and effective job loss during an
economic strike, waiver of her right to resign may be found procedurally
unconscionable. Unless caution is taken in drafting the individual con-
tracts providing for waiver of resignation rights and assuring that employ-
ees are fully apprised352 of the potential consequences of their signature,
such waivers may be unconscionable, analogous to contracts of adhesion
in the context of consumer transactions.5 3
C. Manner of Waiver
Although the right to resign does not appear so radically distinct from
other statutory rights as to preclude waivability of the right per se, the
nature of the right demands particular attention to the manner of waiver.
Given the Thirteenth Amendment's outlaw of involuntary servitude,354
the Fifth Amendment's protection of liberty interests,35s and the tradi-
tional common law prohibition of assignments of wages,356 courts would
likely consider indefinite waiver of the right to resign to be unconsciona-
351. See, e.g., Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69, 86 (1960) (discuss-
ing the effect of a virtually illegible disclaimer of warranty clause in the context of stan-
dardized mass contacts). One commentator stated:
Where an aggrieved party is ignorant of the risk involved, ignorant of the contract
terms which transfer or allocate that risk and/or lacks alternative terms for that
risk allocation, the contract or clause may be unconscionable .... Stated simply,
contract terms which transfer risks or the burdens of a transaction from that
which might be expected in an exchange, absent a written agreement, are unen-
forceable unless intelligently, knowingly, and voluntarily assumed.
Jeffrey C. Fort, Understanding Unconscionability: Defining the Principle, 9 Loy. U. Cm.
L.J. 765, 798 (1978) (emphasis added).
352. Lockheed's clear and unmistakable waiver test assures that the employee is aware
she has taken on a certain obligation. However, mere awareness generally cannot defuse
the problem of power. See Lockheed, 302 N.L.R.B. 322, 329 (1991).
353. See Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARv.
L. Rnv. 1173 (1983); see also John E. Murray, Jr., Unconscionability: Unconscionability, 31
U. Prrr. L. REv. 1 (1969).
354. U.S. CosrsT. amend. XIII, § 1.
355. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
356. Farnsworth, supra note 105, § 11.4.
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ble.357 To avoid a finding of unconscionability, the union must carefully
tailor contracts waiving resignation rights to accommodate concepts of
limited duration, independent consideration, and notice.
1. Limited Duration
The NLRA does not expressly provide for a right to resign, nor does it
address the issue of reasonable duration of waiver of the right. To avoid
implications of unconscionability, the union should include in resignation
right-waiving contracts a window period permitting resignation, analo-
gous to the mandatory provision for revocation of dues checkoff authori-
zation in Section 302(c)(4) of the Act. Ideally, the timing of the
resignation period should constitute a balance of (1) the union's end of
accumulating waivers of resignation rights to amass numbers of reliable,
potential strikers and enhance bargaining clout and (2) the employees'
right to refrain from collective activity.
This Comment suggests permitting employees to revoke their resigna-
tion-right waivers, and/or resign at the end of three years or between sixty
and ninety days prior to the expiration date of the collective bargaining
agreement, whichever occurs first. This period is preferable because it
mirrors the permissible time frame358 for filing of RC petitions by a rival
union desiring to oust the incumbent union.359 In determining the time
frame for entertaining such petitions, the Board struck a balance between
society's need for industrial stability and individual choice in representa-
tion.360 Since waiver of the right to resign is intended to promote
industrial stability by replenishing the union's bargaining power, and
357. See Note, Restriction on the Right to Resign: Can a Members' Freedom to "Escape
the Union Rule" Be Overcome by Union Boilerplate?, 42 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 397, 415
(1974) ("[P]ermitting resignations during any period reduces the strength of the union...
[however,] it is the timing of the escape period that is crucial.").
358. One commentator has proposed that union members be permitted to resign until
the taking of a strike vote. See Gidley, supra note 289, at 368. This author, however,
considers such a time to be "too late" to promote union stability, and difficult to attain in
the wake of Pattern Makers'. Strikes often occur at the expiration of a collective bargain-
ing agreement, when negotiations are stalled. Requiring resignation or release from
waiver 60 to 90 days prior to the contract's expiration would grant the union time to assess
the strength of its bargaining position and negotiate more efficiently to avert a potential
strike. The upper limit of three years addresses the practical reality that most collective
bargaining agreements last for three years, but where the contract has been prematurely
extended, accommodation of individual rights requires providing the employee the option
of changing her mind. See Hertz Corp., 265 N.L.R.B. 1127, 1129 (1982).
359. The contract bar generally prohibits elections for a period of three years or the
expiration term of the contract, whichever is shorter. General Cable Corp., 139 N.L.R.B.
1123, 1124 (1962) (extending the Board's previously established two-year contract bar rule
to three years).
360. 1d. at 1126.
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"voluntary unionism" mandates protection of individual choice in the ex-
ercise of Section 7 rights, it seems reasonable to conclude that the balance
once struck by the Board to accommodate such twin goals need not be
recalibrated.361
2. Consideration
The Supreme Court interpreted the Taft-Hartley Act to find union
membership, "as a condition of employment... whittled down to its fi-
nancial core."362 Consequently, the most the union can exact from non-
members, i.e. financial core members employed under union-security
agreements, is to tender periodic dues and initiation fees. The union,
however, has a judicially-recognized duty to represent fairly both finan-
cial core and full union members. 363 A contract waiving the right to re-
sign could not be enforced absent additional consideration because the
union has a pre-existing duty to represent all employees in collective bar-
gaining, whereas the employee has no parallel obligation to waive her
right to resign in exchange for the benefits of union representation.
364
Therefore, the union must provide additional consideration in order to
effectuate a valid contractual waiver of the right to resign.365
Having determined the necessity of additional consideration, the next
hurdle is isolating what the union may offer in consideration of the indi-
vidual employee's waiver of the right to resign. The proffered considera-
tion deemed adequate in the Beck rights waiver scenario, the right to
attend union meetings, would be inadequate. The inadequacy stems from
the fact that those employees who waive their right to resign will gener-
ally not be dues objectors, but rather full members already entitled to
attend meetings.3 66 The union could, however, offer relief of an obliga-
361. Cf. Engineers Union Local 444 (Sperry Rand Corp.), 235 N.L.R.B. 98 (1978) (find-
ing contracts with resignation periods limited to last 10 days of the year or contract to be
unduly restrictive).
362. NLRB v. General Motors Corp., 373 U.S. 734, 742 (1963) (emphasis added).
363. See discussion of judicially created duty of fair representation, supra note 36.
364. See also Miller v. Hanson, No. 493363 (St. Louis County Cir. Ct. filed July 26,
1983). In Miller, the Board filed a Section 8(b)(1)(A) charge against the union for its
attempt to enforce agreements against employees who had promised to remain union
members until the union's cessation of unit representation or the individual's cessation of
employment in the unit, whichever occurred first, where the union's promise to continue to
represent the bargaining unit constituted the consideration.
365. Consideration is also significant in assessing whether or not a contract is uncon-
scionable. See Fort, supra note 351, at 771-75 (finding grossly unequal exchanges per se
unconscionable).
366. This Comment proposes that the fairest result would be to deprive strikebreakers
of the benefits achieved by the union during a strike, although to do so would be impermis-
sible under Section 101 of the LMRDA. There is little incentive for the individual worker
to see any strike through to its conclusion once her private costs begin to mount if she can
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tion imposed by the union's constitution in exchange for limited waiver of
the right to resign.367 For example, the union could offer to relieve those
right-waiving employees of picket duty, in event of a strike.
3. Notice
Finally, to ensure that waiver of the right to resign is not unconsciona-
ble, the union should provide each employee with information, both writ-
ten and oral, that explains the potential ramifications of waiver of the
right to resign. The language of the waiver contract should indicate
clearly and unequivocally what the employee is giving up and what the
union is offering her in consideration for waiver of the right to resign.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Board has increasingly regulated the union-member relation-
ship.368 Perhaps nowhere is this more evident than in the Board's infla-
tion of the right to resign by virtue of its tight-fisted control of union
discipline.369 Yet the Board's opinion in Lockheed tentatively begins to
loosen the Board's grip on the union-member relationship by yielding to
the power of freedom of contract, individually exercised, to affect the
union-member relationship. By permitting "clear and unmistakable"
waiver of the right to revoke dues checkoff authorization, the Board has
opened the door for speculation on the extent of waivability of other stat-
utory rights. At the barest minimum, the Board has greatly expanded the
benefit from both the employer's paycheck for strikebreaking and the benefits the union
attains in the event her former comrades are successful in attaining the goals of the strike.
The War Labor Board's "maintenance of membership" rule addressed the inequity of such
a situation. The rule required that anyone joining a union, for whatever reason, was obli-
gated to retain membership until the next contract was signed. HARRY A. MILLIS & EM-
ILY C. BROWN, FROM THE WAGNER Acr TO TAFr-HARTLEY: A STUDY OF NATIONAL
LABOR POLiCY AN LABOR RELATIONS 296-97 (1969).
367. This Comment declines to speculate at this point on the inevitable conundrum:
"When does relief of an obligation constitute the conferral of a benefit?"
368. See generally Hartley, supra note 72, at 12 (discussing how the Board has become a
major regulator of internal union government despite protestations to the contrary).
369. See supra notes 258-317 and accompanying text.
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370. Whether this development is beneficial for labor law is an issue this author leaves
open for speculation. From one vantage point, the use of individual contracts to waive
Beck rights and resignation rights may be viewed as a return to the commodity theory of
labor popular during the Lochner era which championed individual freedom of contract as
the best guarantor of labor liberty. See Pope, supra note 53, at 1076-77. In line with this
markedly individualistic perspective, permitting individual waivers may decrease Board in-
volvement in union affairs once the parameters for waiver have been set, i.e., clarity of
waiver language, duration, notice, and consideration. However, emphasis on individual
contracts could subtly erode the essence of solidarity achieved by the uniformly applicable
collective bargaining agreement and majority rule, even defeating the goal of such waivers
as a tool for creating solidarity. See, e.g., Brousseau, supra note 164, at 12 (stating that
"the law of labor relations is designedly and necessarily anti-individualistic"). Whether
courts will uphold waivers of Beck rights and resignation rights remains undetermined. If
waivers are deemed consistent with the current direction of federal labor policy, they will
be permitted. The passage of a near century has not altered the veracity of Justice Holmes'
adage: "[t]he true grounds of decision are considerations of policy and social advantage."
Vegelahn v. Guntner, 44 N.E. 1077, 1080 (Mass. 1896) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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